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Cert to CAS

~
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BURD:~E (5.j-.:;l_,.~~) ~ F-:fer~ivil
1.

SUMMARY:

Timely

----

Respondent, a state agency, alleges conflicts in the
,...--

.

___________________

circuits _5!;!._er (1) the burden of proving in Title VII suits that an

-

employer
reason for dismissing a plaintiff who
--··- had a- non-discriminatory
________.,.
has proven a prima facie case of discrimination, and (2) the proper
standard for appellate review of a district court's finding of no
(

....__...
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(2)

Respondent, a woman, was employed as a "field services

coorindator" by the Public Service Careers Division (PSC) of the Texas
Department of Community Affairs (TDCA).

In 1972, respondent's immediate

supervisor, a "project director" resigned.

The head of PSC did not

appoint a new project director, however, and instead divided the job's
responsiblities among several persons including respondent.

In 1973, the

United States Department of Labor (DOL), which provided all funds for
PSC, threatened to terminate those funds unless certain inadequacies in
staffing and organization were corrected.

The head of PSC at that time,

one B. R. Fuller, brought an outsider, Robert Watts, in to fill the
position of project director.

Fuller also promoted one Robert Walz from

his position as a subordinate to respondent to the newly created position
of project coordinator.

Finally, Fuller dismissed respondent.

(

Respondent filed suit in federal court, alleging that she had been
the victim of sex discrimination in violation of Title VII.
three different incidents of discrimination:

She alleged

(1) The hiring of Watts

rather than her to fill the position of project director; (2) the
promotion of Walz to project coordinator and her concurrent dismissal,
and (3) a denial of pay equal to that received by male project directors
who performed duties similar to hers between 1972 and 1973.
court {Roberts,

w.

The district

D. Tex.) entered judgment for petitioner, finding "no

basis upon which to hold that [respondent] has been discriminated against
because of her sex.

"

As relevant to the present petition, the CA 5 reversed the district
court's entry of judgment against respondent on her claim that the
promotion of Walz and her concurrent dismissal violated Title VII.
First, the CA5 looked to this Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas CoU2.
v. Green, 411

u.s.

792 {1973)

and concluded that respondent had made out

-

3 -

a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII because she had
shown that (1) she belongs to a group (i.e., females) protected by the
statute, (2) she applied for and was was qualified for the job eventually
given to Walz, (3) she was rejected for that position despite her
qualifications, and (4) Fuller eventually filled the position with a
person having similar or even lesser qualifications than respondent.
Given such a prima-facie case, the CAS noted that McDonnell Douglas
placed the burden on petitioner "to articulate some legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for"

responde~t's

rejection.

411 U.S. at 802.

According to the CAS, an employer does not satisfy this burden unless it
proves by a preponderance of the evidence
non-discriminatory reason.

-----------

th~t

it acted for a

Here, the CAS on review of the evidence found

that the only reason "articulated" by Fuller for elevating Walz over
(

respondent was Fuller's subjective and apparantly uncorroborated opinion
that petitioner had trouble dealing with her co-workers.

While conceding

that Walz was "qualified" for the job of project coordinator, the CAS
.
felt that respondent was equally qualified and held that petitioner's
showing was insufficient to overcome petitioner's prima facie case of
discrimination.
The CAS also rejected petitioner's contention that it was bound to

t

phold the district court's finding of non-discrimination unless the

ppellate court believed that holding to be "clearly erroneous."

The CAS

admitted that it was bound by the trial court's findings of "evidentiary
facts" unless they were clearly erroneous, but refused to apply that
standard of review to the district court's finding of non-discrimination
because that finding, while technically a finding of fact, was "the
ultimate issue for resolution in a Title VII case."

The CAS therefore

made an independent determination of the merits of respondent's
allegations of discrimination.
.,~

.......
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3.

(A)

CONTEN'riONS:

Petitioners assert that, by requiring an

employer to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination by proving by a
preponderance of the evidence that the personnel action was taken for
non-discriminatory reasons, the CAS misinterpreted this Court's mandate
~

~

in McDonnell Douglas and created a conflict with the CAl.

In McDonnell

Douglas, the Court spoke in terms of "articulat[ing]" a legitimate
-

nondiscrimatory reason for the employee's rejection.

According to

petitioners, by interpreting "articulate" to mean "prove by a

----------

~

------.

preponderance of the evidence" the CAS has imposed upon the employer th e

-

burden . of disproving discriminatory intent,. a result contrary to· this
Court's specific holding in Board of Trustees v. Sweeney, 439
(1978).
(

u.s.

24

Furthermore, petitioner quotes Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d

1003, 1011 (CAl 1979), where the CAl stated:

We think it now clear that McDonnell Douglas
leaves the burden of persuasion at all times with
the plaintiff, and that the employer's burden to
a "articulate 11 a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason is not a burden to persuade the trier that
he was in fact motivated by that reason and not
by a discriminatory one. Rather it is a burden
of production -- i.e., a burden to articulate or
state a valid reason, following which the
complainant must show that the reasons so
articulated or stated is a mere pretext or
11
Cover-up 11 for what was in truth a discriminatory
purpose.
(emphasis in original).
Respondent replies that the CAS correctly interpreted McDonnell
Douglas.

According to respondent, were an employer permitted to rebut a

prima facie case of discrimination merely by advancing a plausible,
non-discriminatory reason for the action, the burden on the employer
would be light indeed.

Respondent also believes that the burden of

proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the personnel action wa E

- s taken for non-discriminatory reasons is not the same as a burden of
proving the absense of discrimintory intent as discussed in Sweeney.
Respondent does not discuss the alleged conflict with Loeb.
{B)

Petitioner asserts that the standard of review applied by the

CAS to the district court's finding of no discrimination conflicts with
the standard of review employed in the

~Al.

According to petitioner, CA1

will uphold a district court's finding on the issue of discrimination
unless that finding is clearly erroneous.
Trustees~

See Sweeney v. Board of

604 F.2d 106 {CAl 1979), cert. denied

u.s.

{1980).

Respondent concedes that the CAl applies a different standard of
appellate review than that employed in the present case.

Nevertheless,

respondent asserts that, even under the Sweeney standard, petitioner
failed to present sufficient support for the district court's finding of
~

non-discrimination.
4.

DISCUSSION:

There would seem to be direct conflicts between the

CAS and CAl on both of the issues raised by petitioner. Furthermore,
~
although it is possible that the CAS might have reached the same
conclusion had it employed the CAl's standards, the CAS carefully stated
the standards it was applying and gave no indication that it would have
reversed under less rigorous standards.

The questions presented in this

petition would seem to be of some importance, but conceivably could
benefit from consideration by other CA's prior to intervention by this
Court.
There is a response and a supplement to the petition.
6/4/80
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~IT.
Question Presented
Must
preponderence
discriminatory

an
of

employer
the

reason

in

a

evidence
supports

Title VII
that
its

a

case

prove

by

legitimate,

employment

a

non-

decision,

in

order to rebut the plaintiff's prima facie case?

I

This

case

arises

from

this

Court's,

and

the

lower

courts', continuing difficulty in defining with precision the
evidentiary burden an employer bears in a Title VII case. The
tripartite shifting··· of burdens
was first set out in <anonnell
...
Douglas

Corp.·

-v.

Green,

411

U.S.

792

(1973).

First,

the

plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination.

The elements of the prima facie case are familiar and are not
in dispute in this case. Furnco Constr. Co v. Walters, 438
567,

577-78

case:

it

elaborated the purpose of the prima facie

(1978)

"raises

u.s.

an

because we presume

inference
these acts,

of

racial

discrimination only

if otherwise unexplained,

are

more likly than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors."
The question in this case is what the employer must

- ~
' ' t'1on.
h (0t~ ~~~
1s 1n f erence
o f d'1Scr1m1na

th en s ow o re
1\
Douglas
stated
legitimate,

that

the

employer

nondiscriminatory

must

reason

McDonne 11

"articulate

for

the

some

employee's

rejection." 411 U.S. at 802. Furnco stated that the employer's
burden " is merely that of proving that he based his employment
decision

on

a

illigitmate one
difference

legitimate
such

as

consideration,

race."

438

in language between thse

considerable

confusion

and

led

at

U.S.

two

to

and
578.

not
The

formulation

lower

on

courts

an

slight ~

has

bred

imposing

markedly different burdens on the employer.
Before addressing this ambiguity more particularly it
is helpful to explain what burden the Court has said will shift
to

the

plaintiff

if

the

employer

satisfies

his

burden.

In

McDonnel Douglas, the Court stated that the plaintiff must have
an opportunity

to prove "that petitioner's stated reason for

resp's rejection was in fact pretext." 411 U.S. at 804. Later,
it was stated:

"In short, on the retrial resp must be given a

full and fair opportunity to demonstrate by competent evidence
that the presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in

fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision." Id. at
805. Furnco described the plaintiff's burden at this stage in
much

the

same

opportunity

terms:

"The

introduce

to

plaintiff
evidence

must

be

that

given

the

the

prof feed

u.s.

justification is merely a pretext for discrimination." 438
at

578.

burden

In

short,

the

cases

is

show

that

here

to

indicate
the

that

the

employer's

plaintiff's

stated,

neutral

reason for the employment decision was not the employer's true
reason
Clarification of the employer's burden to rebut the
prima

facie

case was

State College v.
described
also

had

the

offered

Sweeney,

employer's

stated

that,

439

in Board

of Trustees

U.S.

(1978).

burden

"in

24

in

the

requiring

Keene

There CAl had

approved

the

of

manner,

defendant

to

but

prove

absence of discriminatory motive, the Supreme Court has placed
the burden squarely on

the party with

the greater

access

to

such evidence." 569 F.2d at 177. The Court flatly rejected this
description and reaffirmed that the employer's burden was only
to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. Although
four Jus tics dissented

from the summary vacation of

the CA' s

decision, apparently disagreeing as to the characteriazation of
what

the

and

CA

the

propriety

of

summary

consideration

------

done' or 'produc[es] evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory
........____
--.......
____....
reasons.'" 439 u.s. at 25 n.2, quoting dissent at 28, 29. The

---

---

dissent had attempted

to reconcile the different formulations

~

of McDonnell Douglas and Furnco by stating that the only way a
defendant

can "articulate"

proving these reasons."
that

the

only

production;
at all

reasons

is by

testimony,

"thereby

Id. at 29. The dissent clearly stated

burden

on

the

defendant

is

a

burden

of

the burden of persuasion rests with the plaintiff

times.

Id.

The majority appears

to have fully agreed

with this characteriazation.
Following

Sweeney,

most

CA's

have

held

that

the

employer has only a burden of production: taking the stand and
stating a nondiscriminatory reason for

the employment action.

Two cases so holding are worthy of note.
Inc.,

600 F.2d 1003

(1979), CAl

In Loeb v. Textron,

(Campbell, J.)

formulated the

burden in light of the remand of its decision in Sweeney. The
court

held,

leaves

"We

the

plaintiff,

think

burden
and

that

it

of

now

clear

persuasion

the

that

at

employer's

McDonnell

all

burden

times
to

Douglas

with

the

"articulate"

a

nondiscriminatory reason is not a burden to persuade the trier
of fact that he was in fact motivated by that reason and not by
a

discriminatory

this

one."

understanding

was

Id.

at 1011.

The court believed that

most consistent with
"To say,

the
as

burden

that

would

then shiftto the plaintiff.

the court did

here,

that the defendant must prove that its action was based

on a legitimate reason and that the plaintiff must "then" prove
that it was not, is contradictory." Id. at 1012. The court also
atated

that

it

would

require

the

employer

to

state

with

particularity the reasons for the dismissal in order to satisfy
the burden of production.

/

CA2 came to much the same conclusion in Lieberman v.
Gant,

23

FEP Cases

the decisions of

-

505

( 1980) (Friendly,

After

reviewing

this Court leading up to Sweeney,

the court

J.) •

stated:
f

"It is thus enough for the defendan ~ in the
second phase of the case to ~!Dg forth evide~ce
tha
he acted on a neutral bas is.- They do not
have the our en o es a l1s 1ng
at the basis
was sound; rather the burden then falls on the
plaintiff to demonstrate that it is pretextual.
One way of doing this, of course, would be to
show that the asserted neutral basis was so
ridden with error that defendant could not
honestly have relied upon it." Id. at 509.
In other words,

if the employer claims that the plaintiff was

discharged becaue she was

incompetent,

the employer does not

need to prove that the plaintiff was in fact incompetent either
absolutely or relative to other candidates. This would appear
to be so because the employer may be mistaken

in

its

that

be

guilty

the

plaintiff

is

incompetent

but

not

belief
of

discrimination. The plaintiff can make hay from such a mistake
only

if

she

can

show

that

the charge of

incompetence

is

so

baseless that it seems pretextual. CAl in Loeb seemes to agree
with

this;

course

of

it stated
action

may

that

"While

seem

poor

the
to

employer's
outsiders,

judgment or
the

relevant

question is simply whether the given reason was a pretext for
illegal discrimination." 600 F.2d at 1012 n.6. CA2 referred to
the

instant

CAS

case

in

passing

and

suggested

that

it

was

flatly wrong. 23 FEP Cases at n. 7.
These two cases agree that employer's burden is one
of production only. It is important to note that they read this

··'

rule

as

discharging

the

employer

from

proving

two

distinct

facts.

, he need not prove that he actually was motivated

by the

This point is sound; it is compelled by

Sweeney's command that the employer need not prove absence of
discriminatory

motive,

plaintiff of proving

and

by

the

remaining

pretext.~

burden

on

the

the two cases seem also

to hold that the employer need not prove any factual base for
its

neutral

plaintiff,
Douglas,

reason,
in

fact,

that

is

it

engaged

in

need

not

unlawful

prove

that

conduct,

the

McDonnell

that the employer never hired "at the gate", Furnco,

or that more qualififed candidates were available. While this
rule

follws

logically from the premise

that the employer has

only a burden of production, it places a significant burden on
the plaintiff that may be difficult to overcome. This will be
discussed further, infra.

II

Resp,
Services

a

female,

Coordinator.

Her

was

employed

superior,

by

the

petr

as

Project

a

Field

Director,

resigned, and petr applied for his job. Petr hired someone from
a different divsion to take this

job.

At

the command of

the

Dep't of Labor, which provided all the funding for the division
of petr within which resp worked, petr reorganized the division
and reduced the staff. Resp was discharged. Resp brought suit
in the DC alleging, inter alia, that the failure to promote and
the

subsequent

discharge

were

both

prompted

by

gender

discrimination. The DC held for petr, finding that neither acts

had been motivated by gender prejudice. The DC's judgment was
general and did not refer to the shifting burdens of proof.
The

CA

reversed

or~~

failure to promote

in

part.

It

affirmed

as

ground that the male hired

to

the

in place

of resp was more qualified. It reversed as to the discharge of
~
resp. The CA held that resp ahd made out a prima facie case. It
A

discussed the burden then on the employer.
"Defendant may
refute
plaintiff's prima
facie
case
by
articulating
a
legitimate
nondiscriminatory
reason
for
the
rejection.
This
court
requires
defendant
to
prove
nondiscriminatory reasons by a preponderence of
the evidence. Turner v. Texas Instruments, 55
F.2d 1251, 1255 (5th Cir. 1977). This holding is
not inconsistent with [Sweeney], which merely
stated that the defendant is not required to
prove absence of discriminatory motive. Our
holding in Turner simply states the obvious:
"articulating" a legitimate reason involves more
than simply stating ficticious reasons: legally
sufficient proof is needed before the trier of
fact
can
find plaintiff's proof
rebutted."
(emphasis in original).

...
1

CAS adds an additional element to the defendant's rebuttal: he
must show that that the person hired, promoted, or retained was
in

some

objective

sense

better

than

the

plaintiff.

East

v.

Roamine, Inc., 518 F.2d 332 (5th Cir. 1975).
Applying

thses

that the employer

standards

had not

to

sustained

the facts,

the CA held

its burden of proving

a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason by a preponderence of the
evidence.

Petr's

officer

had

friction with other membes of
retained,
been

formerly

suggested

by

resp' s
the

testified

resp

had

had

the staff, and that the person

subordinate,
staff.

that

CAS

was

found

qualified
this

and

had

insufficient

because failed to introduce any objective data to show that the
person retained had good relations with the staff or was more
qualified.
Petr 's

argument

the holding of Sweeney,
the employer
when

the

bald

employer

takes

erred essentially

repeats

in terptreted by CAl in Loeb,

that

burden of production which is met
the

stand

and

states

a

legitimate

the discharge. Resp agues that satisfying a burden

of production
the

as

has merely a

employer

reason for

that CAS

involves

introducing a

assertion of why

factual

the plaintiff was

should have been required

base

to

support

terminated.

The

to show by objective data

that plaintiff was in fact a troublemaker and that the person
retained

in her

place was not.

She argues

that

the employer

should not be able to discharge his burden merely by stating
ficticious reasons.
CAS's insistence that it was not forcing the employer
to prove the absence of discriminatory motive suggests that it
did not wish

to force the employer to prove that it actually

fired resp because she couldn't get along. This conclusion is
far from clear,
petr

lost

different

but the opinion nowhere explicitly holds that

because

the

reaon.

If

squarely presents
must

introduce

the

to

court
this

believed

assessment

question

discharge

of

its

resp
is

what
burden

was

fired

correct,

evidence
of

an

for

the

a

case

employer

production.

CAS

speaks of the employer having a burden of persuasion, but this
burden is limi

fa1\

discharge existed,

to showing that a legitimate reason for

the

not that the plaintiff was discharged

for

that

reason.

In

other words,

CAS holds

that

the defendant's

burden of producing a legitimate reason is satisfied, only if
the the employer carries the burden of persuading the trier of
fact

that

a

legitimate

reason

exists.

The

policy

said

to

support this rule is that an employer should not be deemed to
have

rebutted

the

inference

of

discrimination

raised

by

the

plaintiff's prima facie case, merely by presenting f ictic ious
reasons for the discharge.
In

my

view

CAS's

rule

is

inconsistent

Court's precedents and must be rejected; however,

with

the

in rejecting

the rule the Court should be sensitive to the problem which led
the CA to adopt it. Sweeney seems to hold that the burden of
persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. Under CAS's
rule the employer bears the burden of persuasion to establish
the existance of a legitimate reason for the discharge. During
this

time,

the

employer

is

also

bearing

the

persuasion on the ultimate issue in the case;
does

not persuade

existed,

it

also

discriminated

the

trier

fails

against.

of

to

burden

of

if the employer

fact

that

legitimate

persuade

that

plaintiff

was

does

conflict

Thus,

although

CAS

not

reasons
not

with the holding of Sweeney, as it noted, it does conflict with
the rationale of that case.
CAS's
constrains

the

illustrates.

rule

is

also

discretion

suspect

of

the

on

policy

employer,

as

grounds.
this

Title VII does not require the employer

It

case

to hire

only the candidate who is superior accoraing to objective data
(whatever

that

might

be

in

a

., .

..

;

particular

case);

it ·merely

~

prescribes
basis.

making

CAS would

employment

decisions

require employers

to

on

a

discriminatory

"test" candidates,

and

would hold them liable if they could not convince the trier of
fact

that the decision was correct.

would

have

objectively

to

demonstrate

superior.

Indeed,
the

that

This

approaches

under East,

person
being

they

chosen
a

was

substantive

prophylactic rule. As Loeb states:
"The employer's stated legitimate reason must be
reasonably articulated and nondiscriminatory,
but does not have to be a reason that the judge
or jurors would act on or adopt. Nor is an
employer required to adopt the policy that will
maximise the number of minorities, women, or
older persons in his workforce.
[Furnco] An
employer is entitled to mke his own policy and
business judgments, and may, for example, fire
an adequate employee if his reason is to hire
one who will be even better, as long as this is
not a pretext for discrimination." 600 F.2d at
1012, n. 6.
If the employer must persuade the trier of fact that his reason
for

an

employment

action

is

legitimate,

there

will

be

an

invitation to second-guess his business judgment.
Moreover, CAS's rule returns through the back door a
burden

on

th~ em~{r

to

prove

the

is

that

~--------

motive.

If

concern

absence
the

of

stated

discriminatory
reason

for

the

employment action not be ficticious, there is a suggestion that
the employer must demonstrate that the reason is true.

If the

employer demonstrates that the proffered reason is why he

in

fact rejected the plaintiff, he is simultaneously proving that
he acted without discriminatory intent.
Although I believe that the Court should reject any
burden of persuasion for the defendant, and specifically reject

-------------

--------------------------

._

the

East

rule

that

the

employer

person hired was superior,
to

the

difficulties

defendant

should

production

at

not

unless

must

demonstrete

that

the

the Court should also be sensitive
which

CAS's

be

deemed

it

has

to

rule

is

satisfy

stated

aimed.

its

The

burden

of

legitimate,

its

nondiscriminatory reasons with sufficient clarity to allow the
plaintiff
should

to

not

prove

be

that

buried

they

in

an

are

a

pretext.

avalanche

of

The

vague,

statements nearly impossible to rebut. Also,

plaintiff
cumulative

the Court should

make plain that the employer must state the actual reasons for
the rejection,
not

be

a

not neutral,

significnt

burden

but

ficticious

reaons.

for

the employer

This will

if he need not

JJ

prove that he was motvated by these reason. This burden on the
employer may be sufficient to foster fair proceedings, because,
"[t]he

more

reason,

the easier

indeed

it

idiosyncratic

is one."

uncertainties

of

or

questionable

the

employer's

it will be to expose it as a pretext,
Loeb,

supra,

litigation

600 F. 2d

will

---

spur

at 1012 n.
employers

6.

if

-

The

~ fully

explicate their reasons to give them credibility in the final
.......
weighing.

If

-

the

plaintiff

can

show

that

the

reason

is

suspicious, she will have gone a long way toward showing that
she has been a victim of discrimination. On the facts of this
very case, a reasonable DC might find that resp has carried her
burden of showing that the employer's reason for the rejection
was pretext.

See Sweeney v.

Borad of Trustees,

604 F.2d 106

(1st Cir. 1979) (DC's holding after remand that plaintiff proved

'

,,

. t

discrimination not clearly erroneous), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct.
733 (1980).
IQ:_ summary,

I

would

reverse the CA' s

decision that

petr had to carry a burden of persuading the trier of fact that
legitimate

reasons

for

resp's

rejection

existed

in

fact.

I

would hold that the employer has only a burden of production. I
would,

however,

attempt to describe this burden of production

in such a way that the plaintiff will have a "full and fair"
opportunity to demonstrate that it is a pretext.
The other issues raised by the parties should not be
decided. Petr asks whether the clearly erroneous rule applies
to the DC's ultimate
discrimination.

If

finding

the

Court

that there has or
finds

that

has

not

the CA applied

been
the

wrong standard to the case, there is no occassion to reach this
issue.

I

note,

however,

that the app licibility of the clearly

erroneous rule to ultimate questions of mixed law and fact is a
difficult question upon which the circuits are split and which
this

Court

~alance

must

someday

address.

Resp

asks

the

Court

to

the evidence under the proper legal standard and find

that she has been the victim of discrimination.
properly the function of the CA.

This

is more

•
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79,-:1764
!fex~ts pepaftmen~ of Communi~yj On Writ of Certiorari to

Affp.P'!! 1

Pe~ipionez:,
v~

Joyce f'\qn :ijur:dine.

~he United States Court
of Appeals fqr the Fifth
Circuip.

[Januar.y -, 1981]
JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to address again the nature of the
flVidentiary burden placed upon the defendant in an employment discrimination suit brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. Thenar,
row question presented is whether, after the plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the
burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the court by a
preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscrimina,
tory reason~ for the challenged employment action ~xisted.

I
Petitioner, the Texas Department of Community Affairs
(TDCA), hired respondent, a female, in January 1972, for
the position of accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers
Division (PSC) . PSC provided training and employment
opportunities in the public sector for unskilled workers.
When hired . respondent possessed several years' experience in
employment training. She was promoted to Field Services
Coordinator in July 1972. Her supervisor resigned in November of that year, and respondent was assigned additional
duties. Although she applied for the supervisor's position of
Project Director, the position remained vacant for six months.
PSC was funded completely by the United States Depar-t-
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ment of Labor. The Department was seriously concerned
about inefficiencies at PSC. 1 In February, 1973, the Department notified the Executive Director of TDCA , B. R. Fuller,
that it would terminate PSC the following month. TDCA
officials, assisted by respondent, persuaded the Department to
continue funding the program, conditioned upon PSC reforming its operations. Among the agreed conditions were
the appointment of a permanent Project Director and a complete reorganization of the PSC sta:ff. 2
After consulting with personnel within TDCA, FulJer hired
a male from another division of the agency as Project Director. In reducing the PSC staff, he fired respondent along
with two other employees, and retained another male, Walz, as
the only professional employee in the division. It is undisputed that respondent had maintained her application for the
position of Project Director and had requested to remain with
TDCA. Respondent soon was rehired by TDCA and assigned to another division of the agency. She received the
exact salary paid to the Project Director at PSC, and the subsequent promotions she has received have kept her salary and
responsibility commensurate with what she would have received had she been appointed Project Director.
Respondent filed this suit in the United States Distr'ct
Court for the Western District of Texas. She alleged that
the failure to promote and the subsequent decision to terminate her had been predicated on gender discrimination in
violation of Title VII. After a bench trial, the District Court
held that neither decision was based on gender discrimination.
The court relied on the testimony of Fuller that the em1Jlovment decisions necePsitated by the commands of the Department of Labor were based on consultation among trusted
Among the problem. identified were overstaffing, lack of fisral control,
poor b'lokkeeping, lack of eommunicatwn among PSC staff, and the l11rk
of a full-time project director. Letter of March 20, 1973 from Charles:
John son to B. R. Full er, reprinted in App, at 38-40.
a See id., at 39.
1
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advisors and a nondiscriminatory evaluation of the relative
qualifications of the individuals involved. He testified that
the three individuals terminated did not work well together,
and that TDCA thought that eliminating this problem would
improve PSC's efficiency. The court accepted this explanation as rational and, in effect, found no evidence that the
decisions not to promote and to terminate respondent were
prompted by gender discrimination.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part.
608 F. 2d 563 (1979). The court held that the District
Court's "implicit evidentiary finding" that the male hired as
Project Director was better qualified for that position than
respondent was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court
affirmed the District Court's finding that respondent was not
discriminated against when she was not promoted. The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court's finding that Fuller's testimony sufficiently had rebutted respondent's prima facie case of gender discrimination in the decision
to terminate her employment at PSC. The court reaffirmed
its previously announced views that the defendant in a Title
VII case bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of legitimate 110ndiscriminatory reasons
for the employment action and that the defendant also must
prove by objective evidence that those hired or promoted were
better qualified than the plaintiff. The court found that
Fuller's testimony did not carry either of these evidentiary
burdens. It, therefore, reversed the .iudgment of the District
('ourt and remanded the case for computation of backpay. 3
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the burden or" proof borne by the defendant conflicts with interpretat.ions of our precedents adopted by other courts of appeals, 4
s The Court of Appeals also vacated the District Court's JUdgment that
petitioner did not violate Title VII's equal pay provisiou, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2 (h), but that decision is not challenged here.
4 See, e. g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60 (CA2 1980); Jackson v.
U, S, Steel Corp., 624 F. 2d 436 (CA3 1980); Ambush v. Montgomery
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we gritnted certior.ar.i- U. S. - · (1980). We now vacate
the Fifth Circuit's decision and I'etnahd for application of the
correct standard.

II
In McDonnell DoU{)las Corp. v. Greeri, 411 U, R. 792 (1973) ,
we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of present,ation of proof in a 'fiti{' VII case alleging discriminatory
treatment. 5 First. the plaintiff has the burden of proving by
the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." id., at 802. Third. shouid the defendant
carry this burden. the plaintiff must then have an opportunity
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons, but were a pretext for discrim!natlon. ld., at 804.
The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant
should be understooJ in light of the piaintiff's ultimate and
intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading
the trier of fact that the defendant intentionaiiy discriminated
against the piaintiff remains at ail time with the plaintiff.
See Board of Trustees of Keene State Coliege v. Sweeney, 439
tJ. S. 24, 25, n. 2 (1979); iJ., at 2§ (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
See generally 0 Wigmore, Evidence § 2489 (Sd ed. 1940) (the
burden of persuasion "never shifts;' ). The Mcbonnell Douglas division of intefmediate evidentiary burdens serves to
'county Government, ~i FEP Cases iiol (CA4 1980}; toeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F .2d 1003 (CAl 1979). But see Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec .
Coi'P., 620 F . ~d 855 (C~S i9so) , cert. pending, No,S0-276.
5 We have recognized that the factual issues, and therefore the character
of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that a facially
neuLml employment policy has a discriminatory impact on protected
classes. See McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U . S., at 802, n . 14; Teamai'e~8 Vhi'ted States, 4.31 U.S. 324, 335-336, and n. l5 (im7).

v.
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bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to
this ultimate question.
The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate
treatment is not onerous. In the instant case, respo11dent had
only to show that she was a qualified woman who sought an
available position, but was rejected in favor of a man. See
McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802. 'The prima facie case
serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates
the most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintifi''s
rejection. As the Court explained in Furnco C0'118truction Co.
v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577 (1978), the prima facie case
"raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are mote likely than
not based on the consideration of impermissible factors."
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discrimiuated a.gainst
the employee. If the employer is silent in the face of this
presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff'
because no issue of fact t•emains in the caM.
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to
rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the piaintili was rejected, ot someone else was preferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. See Sweeney, supra, at 25.
It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintifi'.6 To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set
e This evidentiary relationship between the presumption created by a
prima facie ease and the consequential burden of production placed on the
dP-fendant is a traditiOnal feature of the common law. "The word 'presumption' properly used refers only to a device for allocating the production burden ." F . James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 7.9, at 255
(2d edo 1977) (footnote omitted). See generally 9 Wigmore, Evidence
§849i (3d Ed 1940) Cf, J Maguire, Evi~ence, Common Sense and Cob1,
0

,,

0
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forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. The explanation pro ..
vided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the
defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted/ and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of
specificity. Placing this burden of production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and
to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext. The sufficiency of the defendant's evidence should
be evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these functions.
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered
reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy oi credence.
See M cDonneU Doug.ias, sufi'ttl, at 804-805.
inon Law, 185-186 (1947). Usually, assessing the burden of production
helps the judge determine whether the litigants have created an issue of
fact to be decided by the jury. ln a Title VII case, the allocation of
burdens ~lld the creation of a rresumption by t'he establishment of a prima
facie case is intended progres:!nvely to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive
factual question of intentional discrimination.
7 See generally J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on 'l!vidl'nce 346 (1898).
In saying that the presumption drops from the t:ase, we do not mean to
imply lhat inferenres of discrimination or intent suggE'Bted by the plaintiff's evidence a're irnpcrmi:s~>ihle. We merely :=;:ty that, such infermces are
no longer mandatory a.fter the defrnda.nt has given 1t lt•gally sufficient
explanation for his action. The plaintiff's evidence and its permissible
inferences then should be evaluated in the context of the total evidenc~
Qn the is~'Uc of whether the defendant's explanation is preLext\\ul.
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III
In reversing the judgment of the District Court that the
discharge of respondent from PSC was unrciated to her sex,
the Court of Appeals adhered to two ruies it had devPloped
to elaborate the defendant;s burden ot proof. First, the defendant must prove by a preponderence of the evidence that
legitimate. nondiscriminatory reasous for the dischargr PxistPd.
608 F. 2d. at 567. See 1''urner v. Texas instrurnentis, luc., 555
F. 2d 1251, i255 (CA5 1977). Second, to satisfy this burden,
the defendant "must
prove
that thosel he" hired . . . were
. "
.
somehow better qualified than was plamtiff; ii1 other words,
comparative evidence is needed." 608 F. 2d, at 567 ( emphasis in originai). See East v. Romine, inc., 518 F. 2d 332,
3:39- 340 (CA5 1975) .
A
Tl1e Court of Appeals has misconstrued the nature of the
burden that McDonneii Douglas and its progeny place on thP
defendaut. See Part H, supra. We stated in Sweeney that
"the employer's burden is satisfied if he simply 'explains what
he has done' or 'produc[es1 evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.' " 439 U. S., at 25, n. 2, quoting id. ,
at 28 29 (STEVENS. J., dissenting). lt is plain that the Court
of A~peals required much more: it piaced on the defendant
the burden of persuading the court that had co11viucing, objective reasons for prefl'rring the chosen applicant abon• the
plaintiff.8
~•

• The colll't reviewed the defendan t's evidence and explainrd its
defir1en c:y·
"Dcfendnnt failrd to in troduce comparative factual data. concerning
Bnrdine and Walz. Fuller Int>rely lestifieu that he discharged and retained per~onnel in the spring shakeup at TDCA primarily on the recommendations of subordinates and that he considered Walz qualified for the
position he wAs ret nin ed to do . Fuller failr d to sperify any obj ective
rritel'ia on wh1 eh he b:1sed the decision to discharge Burdine and retain
Wnlz. H e stat rd only that the action was m thr brst inl cre. t of the
pjoogbffi. and that the~e had been ~omc fri ction within th r departm ent that
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The Court of Appeals distinguished Sweeney on the grounds
that the case held only that the defendant did not have th~
burden of proving the absence of discriminatory intent. But
this distinction slights the rationaie of Sweeney and of our
pther cases. We have stated consistently that the employee's
prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the employer articuiates lawful reasons for the action; that is, to
satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissibie evidence which, in the absence of any evidence of pretext, would aiiow the trier of fact rationally to
conclude that the employment decision had not heen motivated by cliscrimi~atory animus. ;rhe Court of Appeals
would require.the defendant tq introduce evidence which, in
the absence of any evidence of pretext, would persuade the
trier of fact that the employment action was lawful. This
exceeds what properly can be demanded to satisfy a burden
of production . .
The court placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant apparently because it feared that "[i]f an employer need
~mly articulate-not prove-a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for his .action, he may c~mpose fictitious, but legiti~
mate, reasons for his actions." Turner v. Texas Instruments,
Inc., supra, at 1255 .(emphasis in original). We do not believe, however, .t hat limiting the defendant's evidentiary obligation to a burden of production.w,ill unduly hinder the plaintiff. First, as noted above, the defendant's explanation of its
legitimate -reasons must be .clear and reasonably specific.
Supra, ,at. 5-6. See Loeb v. 71extron, Inc. , 600 F. 2d 1003,
1011- 1012, n. 5 (CA11979). This obligation arises both from
the necessity of rebutting the inference of discrimination arismight be allel'iated by Burdine's discharge. Nothing in the record indicates whether he examined Walz' ability to work well with others. This
court in East found such unsubstantiated assertions of "qualification" a.~;~d
i~prjorn work rcc·ord" insufficient absent data that ·will ·allo-..y ~~ true compt\rtbon of the individuals hired and reject ed." 608 F . 2d, at 568.
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ing from the prima facie case and from the requirement that
the plaintiff be afforded "a full and fair opportunity" to
demonstrate pretext. Second, although the defendant does
not beal' a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant nevertheless retains an. incentive to persuade the trier of fact that
the employment decision was lawful. Thus, the defendant
normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its explanation. Third, the liberal discovery rules applicable to any
civil suit in federal court are supplemented in a 'l'itle VII suit
by the plaintiff's access to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's investigatory files. See EEOC v. Associated Dry
Goods Corp.,-- U. S. ~ (1981 ). Giveu these factors, we
are unpersuaded that the plaintiff will nnd it particularly
difficult to prove that a proffered explanation lacking a factual
basis is a pretext. We remain confident that the McDonnell
Douglas framework permits the plain tiff meriting relief to
demonstrttte intentionttl discrimination.

B
The Court of Appeals also erred in requiring the defendant
to prove by objective evidence that the persou hireu or
promoted was more qualified than the piaintiff. McDonnell
Douglas teaches that it is the piaintift's task to demonstrate
that similarly situated empioyees were not treated equally.
411 U. S., at 804. The Court of'Appeais' rule would require
the employer to show that the piaintiff's objective qualifications were inferior to those of the person selected. If
it cannot, a court would, in efl"ect, concluue that it has
discriminated.
The court's procedural rule harbors a substantive error.
Title VII prohibits all discrimination in employment based
upon race, sex and national origin. "The broad, overriding
interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair
nn:cl ~ ~ ~ ne·u ttal employment and personnel decisions." Me-
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Donnel Douglas, supra, at 801. Title VII, howeveF, does not
demfl,nd that an employer give preferential treatment to minorities or women. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j). See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 205-206 (1979). · The stat-:
ute was not intended to "diminish traditional management
prerogatives." id., at 207. It does not require the employer
to restructure his employment practices to maximize the number of minorl.ties and women h1red. Furrico Construction Co.
v. Waters, 438 U.S., at 577-578.
The views of th~ . Court of Appeals can be read, we think, as
requiring the employer to hire the minority or female applicant whenever . that perso~'s obiective quali~ca_tions were
equal to those of a white male applicant. But Title VII does
not obligate a~ empioyer to accord this preference. . Rather,
the employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified c~ndidates, Pt~vided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria. The fact that a court may think that the
employer misjudged the qualifications of the appiicants does
not in itself expose him to Title VII liabiiity, although this
may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrhnination. Loeb v. Textron, 1nc., supra, at
1012, n . 6; see Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60, 65 (CA2
1980).

IV
In summary, the Court of Appeais erred by requiring the
defendant to prove by a preponderence of the evidence the
existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating the
respondent and that the person retained in her stead had
superior objective qualifications for the position. 9 When the
a Because the Court of Appeals applied the wrong legal staJJdard to the
evidence, we have no occasion to decide whether it erred in not reviewing the District Court's finding of no intentional discrimination under
the "clearly erroneous'' standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a).
Addressing this issue in this case wouJd be inappropriate because the
District Court made no findings on the intermediate questions posed by

McDonn~U Douglas.
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plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the
defendant bears only the burden of explaining clearly the
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered•
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CHAMBERS OF"

JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST

January 15, 1981
Re:

No. 79-1764
Burdine

Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v.

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.

Sincerely ;~
I

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference

P.S. (For your eyes only) -- I think that on page 7 in the
third line from the bottom the word "it", or some synonym,
has been inadvertently omitted. If I didn't tell you, HAB
would.
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

January 15, 1981

Re:

No. 79-1764, Texas Dept. of
Community Affairs v. Burdine

Dear Lewis,
I am glad to join your opinion
for the Court.
Sincerely yours,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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CHAMBERS OF
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Re:

79-1764 - Texas Department of
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Dear Lewis ,
I agree.
Sincerely yours,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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Mr. Justice Powell
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

Peter

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Jan. 5, 1981

Burdine
On the basis of a first reading of your draft
opinion of January 5, my comments are as follows:
I find virtually nothing in the opinion with which
I disagree, and you have written it well and clearly.

As

you anticipated, however, it is long for an opinion that can
be viewed as necessary to clarify confusion as to my use of
the word "articulate• in McDonnell Douglas.
There always is the danger of creating fresh
confusion by going into detail and citing hypothetical
examples.

Nor do I think it necessary to rebut some of the

reasons apparently relied on by CAS beyond making clear that
it has misread our cases.
I think Parts I and II are excellent, except I
suggest a revision of the paragraph commencing on page 10
(see my rider A, p. 10).
The place to do the •cutting" is in Part III.
move along quite well until I reach page 14.

I

The paragraph

commencing on that page can, I think, be omitted - or
possibly the point made in a summarized version in a

footnote.

Also, I doubt the desirability of including the

long paragraph that commences near the top of page 16.

It

makes a sound and important point (that a defendant is
required to prove that the person hired or promoted was more
qualified than the plaintiff), but does not your paragraph
commencing at the top of page 17 - possibly with some
embellishment - make the substance of the point?

If

agree, we could eliminate from the middle of page 14
top of page 17.

~:~~~~lili

I believe the rest of the opinion is fine.
If you agree with my suggestions,
draft and deliver it to your editor.
forward promptly.

* * *
I believe the Reporter's Office style book
requires that "Court of Appeals" and "District Court" be
written with initial caps whenever we are speaking about a
specific appellate or district court.

You might

J

jJ~

~~~
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Texas De artment of Communit

Affairs v. Bur ine

~

JUSTICE STEVENS, concurring .

As I understand the Court's opinion, it holds, in essence,
that the ordinary Rules of Procedure and Rules of Evidence
applicable in all federal litigation also apply in Title VII
cases.

I agree, and I add these comments merely to explain my

understanding of certain aspects of that holding.

1.

The Burden of Persuasion

The plaintiff must allege that the defendant discriminated
against her because of her sex, must offer evidence that raises
an inference of discrimination, and must persuade the trier of

,--
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fact that the defendant's employment decision was actually
motivated by the fact that she was a woman.
of persuasion throughout the litigation.

She bears the burden

The contrary holding of

the Court of Appeals was erroneous and must be reversed.

2.

The Prima Facie Case

To establish a prima facie case, plaintiff must introduce

\ .

-
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evidence which, if believed and if unanswered, indicates that it
is more likely than not that defendant discriminated against her
because of her sex.l

Proof that she was one of two equally

qualified persons who applied for a job simultaneously would not
be sufficient; but any evidence tending to indicate that a
neutral decisionmaker would have selected her, creates a
presumption of discrimination.

If defend a nt adduces no evidence, and if the trier of fact
credits the plaintiff's evidence, the presumption of
discrimination created by plaintiff's prima facie case mandates
the entry of judgment for the plaintiff.

If cross examination of

the plaintiff d e monstrates that her testimony was unworthy of
belief, however, the trial judge has the authority to enter
judgment for the defendant without requiring any further
evidence.2

In the typical case, of course, the presumption of

discrimination will shift the burden of proceeding to the
defendant.

1 See McDonald Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802
(1973); Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978).
2 For example, if a plaintiff testified that she was qualified
for a professorship in English, but that a university had refused
to employ her because of her sex, and cross-examination revealed
that she had failed to graduate from high school and consistently
misunderstood ordinary words and phrases used in the courtroom,
no purpose would be served by requiring the defendant to offer
evidence of her lack of qualification.

-
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Defendant's Burden of Proceeding

The defendant's burden of responding to the presumption of
discrimination in a Title VII case is the same as that set forth
in Rule 301 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.3

By offering

evidence of a nondiscriminatory motivation for the employment
decision, the defendant dispels the presumption of discrimination
and creates the critical issue of fact.

At this point, although

plaintiff has the right to offer additional evid e nce of pret e xt,
she has no obligation to do so and is entitled to prevail if the
e vidence already in the record is sufficient to persuade the
trier of facts that her sex was a factor motivating the
defendant's decision.

4.

The "Pretext" Issue

The plaintiff may rebut the defendant's evidence of
nondiscriminatory reasons for her rejection in two quite
different ways.

She may persuade the trier of fact that no

3 Rule 301, "Presumptions in General in Civil Actions and
Proceedings," provides
"In all civil actions and proceedings not
otherwise provided for by Act of Congress or by these
rules, a presumption imposes on the party against whom
it is directed the burden of going forward with
evidence to rebut or meet the presumption, but does not
shift to such party the burden of proof in the sense of
the risk of nonpersuasion, which remains throughout the
trial upon the party on whom it was originally cast."

I
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- 4 factual basis for the defendant's explanation exists.

Thus, for

example, testimony that she was discharged because she was always
late for work could be overcome by convincing evidence that she
was always prompt.

Alternatively, she may admit the factual

basis for the employer's explanation--she was indeed a half hour
late every morning--but nevertheless persuade the trier of fact
that she would not have been discharged if she had been a male.
Perhaps her evidence might reveal that similar male tardiness had
been tolerated or that the decisionmaker had otherwise disclosed
. ·,

a bias against female employees.

The point to be emphasized is that a mixed motivation is not
permissible in the employment discrimination context.

Although

the invidious subjective intent of an individual lawmaker will
not invalidate otherwise permissible legislative action,4 an
employment decision that is motivated in part by the employee's
substandard performance and in part by her gender is
categorically prohibited by the statute.

The employee's burden

on the "pretext" issue is merely to persuade the trier of fact
that her sex played some part in the employer's decision; if she
had been a member of the opposite sex, she would have been
retained.

On the understanding that the foregoing is consistent with

4 washington v. Davis, 4265
concurring).

u.s.
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229, 253

(1976)
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the Court's opinion, I join that opinion •
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-1764
Texas Depar,tment of Community~ On Writ of Certiorari to
Affairs, Petitioner,
the United States Court
v~
of Appeals for the Fifth
Joyce Ann Burdine.
Circuit.
[January - , 1981]
JusTICE PowE~I.. delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to address again the nature of the
evidentiary burden placed upon the defendant in an employment discrimination suit brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. The narrow question presented .ls whether, after the piaintiff has
. proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the
burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the court by a
preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action existed.

I
Petitioner, the Texas Department of Community Affairs
(TDCA), hired respondent, a female, in January 1972, for
the position of accounting clerk in the Phbiic Service Careers
Division ( PSC). PSC provided training and employment
opportunities in the public sector for unskilled workers.
When hired , respondent possessed several years' experience in
employment training. She was promoted to Field Services
Coordinator in July 1972. Her supervisor resigned in November of that year, and respondent was assigned additional
duties. Although she applied for the supervisor's position of
Project Director, the position remained vacant for six months.
PSC was funded completely by the United States Depart-
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ment of Labor. The Department was seriously concerned
about inefficiencies at PSC. 1 In February, 1973, the Department notified the Executive Director of TDCA, B. R. Fuller,
that it would terminate PSC the following month. TDCA
officials, assisted by respondent, persuaded the Department to
continue funding the program, conditioned upon PSC reforming its operations. Among the agreed conditions were
the appointment of a permanent Project Director and a complete reorganization of the PSC staff.2
After consulting with personnel within TDCA, Fuller hired
a male from another division of the agency as Project Director. In reducing the PSC staff, he fired r3spondent along
with two other employees, and retained another male, 'Valz, as
the only professional employee in the division. It is undisputed that respondent had maintained her application for the
position of Project Director and had requested to remain with
TDCA. Respondent soon was rehired by TDCA and assigned to another division of the agency. She received the
exact salary paid to the Project Director at PSC, and the subsequent promotions she has received have kept her salary and
responsibility commemurate with what she would haYc received had she heen appointed Project Director.
Responrlent filed this suit in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Texas. She alleged that
the failure to promote and the subsequent decision to terminate her had been predicated on gender discrimination in
violation of Title VII. After a bench trial, the District Court
held that neither decision was based on gender discrimination.
The court relied on the testimony of Fuller that the employment decisions necessitated by the commands of the Department of Labor were based on consultation among trusted
1 Among the problems identified were overstaffing, brk of fiscal control,
poor br:okkecping, lack of communication among PSC staff, and the lark
of a full-time project director. Letter of Marrh 20, 1973 from Charle&
Johnson to B. R. Fuller, reprinted in App., at 38-40.
2 See icl.> at 39.
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advisors and a nondiscriminatory evaluation of the relative
qualifications of the individuals involved. He testified that
the three individuals terminated did not work well together,
and that TDCA thought that eliminating this problem would
improve PSC's efficiency. The court accepted this explanation as rational and, in effect, found no evidence that the
decisions not to promote and to terminate respondent were
prompted by gender discrimination.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part.
608 F. 2d 563 ( 1979). The court held that the District
Court's "implicit evidentiary finding" that the male hired as
Project Director was better qualified for that position than
respondent was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court
affirmed the District Court's finding that respondent was not
discriminated against when she was not promoted. The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court's finding that Fuller's testimony sufficiently had rebutted respondent's prima facie case of gender discrimination in the decision
to terminate her employment at PSC. The court reaffirmed
its previously announced views that the defendant in a Title
VII case bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons
for the employment action and that the defendant also must
prove by ob.iective evidence that those hired or promoted were
better qualified than the plaintiff. The court found that
Fuller's testimony did not carry either of these evidentiary
burdens. It, therefore, reversed the judgment of the District
Court and remanded the case for computation of backpay. 3
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the burden of proof borne by the defendant conflicts with interpretations of our precedents adopted by other courts of appeals,•
s The Court of Appeals also vacated the District Court's judgment that
petitioner did not violate Title VII's equnl pav provision , 42 U. S. C;
§ 2000e-2 (h) , but that decision is not challf'nged here .
4 See, e. g., Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F . 2d 60 (CA2 1980) : Jackson v.
U. .f) . .S.teel Corp ., 624 F. 2d 4'36·. (CA3 1980) ; AmbJts'h w. Mont,gomery
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we granted certiorari- U. S . - (1980), We now vacate
.
.
'
~he Fifth Circuit's decision and remand for application of the
correct standard.
II
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 4i1 U. s .-792 (1973),
we set forth the basic allocation of bu~dens and order of pres~
entation of proof in a Title VII case alieging discriininatory
treatment. 3 First, t~e plainti~ has the burden of proving by
the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the.
prima facie case, the burden. shifts to the defendant "to artie~
ulate some 1egitimat~, nondiscriminatory . reason for. the em~
ployee's rejection. 1 ~ . !d., at 802. Third, should the defendant
9arry this burden, the plaintiff must then .have an opportunity
~ prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by .~he defendant were nQt its true
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. ld., at 804.
The nature of the burden that shifts to , the defendant
should be understood in,.light pf the plaintiff's ultimate and
intermediate burdens, The ultimate burden of persuading
the trier of fa<~t that-.the defendant iptentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all time with the plaintiff.
See Board of Trustees of Ke,ene State College v~ Sweeney, 439
U.S. 24, 25, n. 2 (1979); id., at 29 (STEVENS, i.,. dissenting).
See generaliy 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2~89 (3d ed. 194p) (the
\>urden of persuasion 11 never shifts~'). The McDonnell Doug7
las division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves to
County Government, 22 FEP Cases 1101 (CA4 1980); Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F .2d ;10(}3· (CA1 1979) . But see Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp ., 620 F. 2d .65~ (CA8 1980), cert. pending, No. 80-276.
• We have recognized that: the factual issues, and therefore the character
of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that a facially
neutral employment policy has a discriminatory impact on · protec~rd
cl88Sell. [ Seellfq!Jonnell-Dougl~ : supra, 4q U., f3., a;t·8Q2 1;:.lJ..l4; Tea~
ater'a United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-336, and n. l5 (i977).

v.
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bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to
this ultimate question.
The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate
treatment is not onerous. The plaintiff must prove by a
proponderence of the evidence that she applied for an available position, for which she was quaiified, but was rejected
under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. 0 The prima facie case serves an important
function in the litigation: it eliminates the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. See
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324. 358 & n. 44 (1977).
As the Court expiained in Furnco Constr·uctio'ii Co. v. Waters,
438 U. S. 5G7, 577 (1978), the prima facie case "raises an
inference of discrimination only because we presume these
acts, if otherwise unexpiained, are more iikeiy than not based
on the consideration of impermissibie factors.;' Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumptioli
that the employer uniawfuliy discriminated against the em•
ployee. If the . trier of ~act believes the plaintiff's evidence,
and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption,
In MrDonnell bougla~>, supra. we described an appropriate model for
a prima facie case of racial cliscrlmination. The plaintiff must show:
"(i) that he br.>longs to a raciai minority; (ii) that he applird and was
qualifird for a job for which the empioyer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, dPspite his qualification, he was rrjected; and (iv) that; after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applieant~ from persons of complainant's qualifications." 411 U. S.,
at 802.
We added, howenr, that this standard is not inflexible, as "[t] he facts
nccess:uily will Yar~· in Title VII cm'f'S, and the specification abo,·e
of thr prima facie proof required from respondent is not nect>sSarily applicable in eyrry respect in differing factual situations." !d., at 802, n. 13.
In the instant. ca~e. it is not. seriou~ly conte~ted tha.t respondent has
proYed a prima f11cie ca::;e. Shr showrd that ~he was a qualified woman
who sought an available po::;ition, but thP po~ition wa~ left open for t:everal
mouths bdore ~he finall~' was rrjeeted in favor of a male who had been
undPr her ~up<·rvi~ion,
6

J
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the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no
issue of fact remains in the casc. 7
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to
rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was preferred, for a iegitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. See Sweeney, supra, at 25.
It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.8 To accomplish this, the defendant must ciearly set
forth, through the introduction of ad:r:nissible ~vidence, the
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. 9 The explanation provided must be iegally suff!.cient to justify ~ judgment for the
defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is re.;
r The phrase "prima facie case" may denote not. only the establishment
of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by
courts to de:>cribe the plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to
permit the trier of fact . to infer the fact at issue. 9 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2494 (3d ed. 1940). McDormeU Douyla.s should have made it apparent
that in the Title VII context we u:;e "prima facie ea::;e" in the former
eense.
8 Titis t>Vi!lentiary relatiuntJhip betwt>en the pr!:'Sumption created by !l
prima facie case and the consequential burden of production placed on the
defendant is a traditional feature of the common law. "The word 'presumption' properly used refers only to a device for ai,locat~_ng_ the production burden." F. James & Q. Hazard, Civil Pro~edure § 7.9, at 255
(2d ed. 1977) (footnote omitted). See generally !} Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2491 (3d Ed. 1940). Cf. J. 1\Taguire, Evidence, Co~mo_n Sense and Common Law, 185-i86 (1947). Usually, assessing the burden o.f production
helps the judge .determine whether the litigants have created an issue of
~act to be decided by the jury. In a Title VII ca~e, the allocation of
burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima
facie rase is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive
factual question of intentional discrimination.
'An articulation not admitted into !'vid!:'tlCP will not suffice. Tlm8, the
defendant. cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to th~ coln:..
plaint· or 'by ar~t!nent of 'CounseL
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butted/ 0 and the factual inquiry proceds to a new level of
specificity. Placing this burden of production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and
to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext. The sufficiency of the defendant's evidence should
be evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these functions.
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered
reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.
This burden new merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered expianation is unworthy of credence.
See M cDonnelt Douglas, supra, at 804-805.

in
In reversing the judgment of_the District Court that the
discharge of respondent from PSC was unrelated to her sex,
the Court of Appeals adhered to two ruies it had developed
to elaborate the ciefencianes burden of proof. First, the defendant must prove by a preponderence of the evidenc;e that
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge existed.
10 See generally .T. Tlm~·e r, Preliminary Treati::;e on Evidence 346 (1898).
In saying that the presumption drops from the ca::;e, we do not imply that
the trier of fac:t no longer may consider evidence previou::;ly introduced by
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A ~atisfactory explanation by
the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of disrrimination
arising from the plaintiff'~ initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence
and inf(~n·nce::; Jlroperly drawn the ref rom may bt• con:-;idered b~· thr trier
of fact. on the issue of whether the defendant's explanat-ion is pretextual.
Indeed, there may be some cases where the palintitT's initial eviden('e, combined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to
di::iereClit the defendant1s ex.palnati~'n·.

7'9-1764-0PINION
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G\08 F. 2d. at 567. See Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555
F. 2d 1251, 1255 (CA5 1977). Second, to satisfy this burden,
the defendant "must prove that those he hired . . . were
somehow better qualified than was plaintiff; in other words,
comparative evidence is needed." 608 F. 2d, at 567 (emphasis in original). See East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F. 2d 332,
339-340 (CA5 1975).
A
The Court of Appeals has misconstrued the nature of the
burden that McDonnell Douglas and its progeny place on the
defendant. See Part II, supra. We stated in Sweeney that
11
the employer's burden is satisfied if he simply 1explains what
he has done' or 1produc res l evidence of legitimate nondiseriminatory reasons.'" 439 U. S., at 25, n. 2, quoting id.,
at 28, 29 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). It is plain that the Court
of Appeals required much more: it placed on the defendant
the burden of persuading the court that it had convincing,
objective reasons for preferring the chosen applicant above
the plaintiff. 11
The Court of Appeals distinguished Sweeneu on the ground
that the case held only that the defendant did not have the
burden of proving the absence of discriminatory intent. But
11 Thr
court review the defPndRnt's evidPnce and explainPd its
deficienry:
"Defendant failed to introduce comparative factual data concerning
Burdine and Walz . Fuller merely testified that he discharged and retained personnel in the spring shakeup at TDCA primarily on the recommendations of subordinates and that he considered Walz qualified for the
position he was retained to do. Fulter failed to specify any objective
criteria on which he based the decision to discharge Burdine and retain
Walz. He stated only that the action was in the best interest of the
program and that there had been some friction within the department that
might be n!lcYiatPd by Burdine's discharge. Nothing in the record indirates whether he examined Walz' ability to work well with others. This
court in East found such unsubstantiated assertions of "qualification" and
"prior work record" insufficient absent data that will allow a true co'mpariso». l:l.f th~ h'ldividuals hired and rejected." 608 F. 2d, at 568.

79-1764-0PINION
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this distinction slights the rationale of Sweeney and of our
other cases. We have stated consistently that the employee's
prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the employer articulates lawful reasons for the action; that is, to
satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissible evidence which would allow the trier of fact
rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not
been motivated by discriminatory animus. The Court of Appeals would require the defendant to introduce evidence
which, in the absence of any evidence of pretext, would
persuade the trier of fact that the employment action was
lawful. This exceeds what properly can be demanded to
satisfy a burden of production.
The court placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant apparently because it feared that "[i] f an employer need
only articulate-not prove-a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for his action, he may compose fictitious, but legitimate, reasons for his actions.;; Turner v. Texas Instruments,
inc., supra, at i255 (emphasis in original). We do not be"'
lieve, however, that limiting the defendant's evidentiary obiigation to a burden of production wiil unduiy hinder the plaintiff. First, as noted above, the defendant's expianation of its
legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably specific.
Supra, at 5-6. See Loeb v. Textron. inc., 600 F. 2d 1003,
1011-1012, n. 5 (CAl 1979). This obligation arises both from
the necessity of rebutting the inference of discrimination arising from the prima facie case and from the requirement that
the plaintiff be afforded "a full and fair opportunity" to
demonstrate pretext. Second, although the defendant does
not bear a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant nevertheless retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact that
the employment decision was lawful. Thus. the defendant
normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its explanation. Third, the liberal discovery rules applicable to any
civil suit i1; federal court are supplemented in a Title VII suit
by ;the .i)laintiff's access to the Equal Employment Opportunity

I
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Commission's investigatory files concerning her complaint.
U. S. - ·
See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., (1981). Given these factors, we are unpersuaded that the
plaintiff will find it particularly difficult to prove that a proffered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext. We
remain confident that the McDonnell Douglas framework
permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination.

B
The Court of Appeals also erred in requiring the defendant
to prove by objective evidence that the person hired or
promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff. · McDonnell
Douglas teaches that it is the piaintiff's task to demonstrate
that simi1ar1y situated employees were not treated equally.
411 U. S., at 804. The Court of Appeais' ruie would require.
the employer to show that the piaintiff's objective qualifications were inferior to those of the person seiected. If·
it cannot, a court would, ih effect, conciude that it has
discriminated.
The court's procedural rule harbors a substantive error.
Title VII prohibits ali discrimination in empioyment based
upon race, sex and nationai origin. 11 ifhe broad, overriding
interest, ~hared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trus~wort~y workma:t;J-ship assured t~rough fair
and . . . neutral employment and personnei decisions." · M cDonnel Douglas, supra, at 801. Title vii, however, does not
demand that an employer give pre~erentia1 treatment to minorities or .women. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (J). See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. $. 193, 205-206 (1979). · The statute was not intended to 11 diminish traditional management
prerogatives." Id., at 207. It does not require the employer
to restructure his employment practices to maximize the number of minorities and women hired. Furnco Construction Co.
v. Waters, 438 U. S., at 577-578.
vtews \lf the Couh of Appeals can be read, we think, lB.s

Tne
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requiring the employer to hire the minority or female appli:
cant whenever that person's objective qualifications were
equal to those of a white male applicant. But Title VII does
not obligate an employer to accord this preference. Rather,
the employer has discretion to choose among equaily qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based upon un,.
lawful criteria. The fact that a court may think that the
employer misjudged the qualifications of the appiicants does
not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this
~ay be pr<;>bat~ve of whether the emP,ioyer's r~asons are preTextron, Inc., sitpra, at
texts for discrimination. Loeb
1012, n. 6; see Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60, 65 (CA2
1980).

v.

IV
. In summary, the Court of Appeals erred by requiring the
defendant to prove by a preponderence of the evidence the
~xistence of n<;mdiscriminatory reasons for terminating th~
respondent and that th.e person retained in her stead had
superior objective qualifications for the position. 12 When the
f.?laintiff has proved 1 a prim{t fa9ie case of discrimination, the
defendant bears only the purden of explaining clearly th~
nondiscriminatory ~easons for its a_ctions. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is vacated ~nd the case is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

1
~ Because the Court of Appeals applied thE' wrong legal standard to the
evidence, we have no occasion to decide whether it ~rred in not reviewing the District Coul't's finding of no int~ntional discrimination under
the "clearly erroneous'' standard of Feder!\! Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a).
Addressing this is~ue in this case w.ould be inappropriate because the
District Co\lrt made no findings on the intermediate questions pos'ed ~y
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

February 11, 1981

Re:

79-1764 - Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine

Dear Lewis:
Please join me.
Respectfully,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-1764
Texas Department of Community) On Writ of Certiorari to
Affairs, Petitioner,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
Joyce Ann Burdine.
Circuit.
[January - , 1981]
JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to address again the nature of the
evidentiary burden placed upon the defendant in an employment discrimination suit brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e et seq. Thenarrow question presented is whether, after the plaintiff has
made out a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the
burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the court by a
preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action existed.

I
Petitioner, the Texas Department of Community Affairs
(TDCA), hired respondent, a female, in January 1972, for
the position of accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers
Division (PSC). PSC provided training and employment
opportunities in the public sector for unskilled workers.
When hired, respondent possessed several years' experience in
employment training. She was promoted to Field Services
Coordinator in July 1972. Her supervisor resigned in November of that year, and respondent was assigned additional
duties. Although she applied for the supervisor's position of
Project Director, the position remained vacant for six months.
PSC was funded completely by the United States Depart-
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ment of Labor. The Department was seriously concerned
about inefficiencies at PSC. 1 In February, 1973, the Department notified the Executive Director of TDCA, B. R. Fuller,
that it would terminate PSC the following month. TDCA
officials, assisted by respondent, persuaded the Department to
continue funding the program, conditioned upon PSC reforming its operations. Among the agreed conditions were
the appointment of a permanent Project Director and a complete reorganization of the PSG stafP
After consulting with personnel within TDCA, Fuller hired
a male from another division of the agency as Project Director. In reducing the PSC staff', he fired respondent along
with two other employees, and retained another male, Walz, as
the only professional employee in the division. It is undisputed that respondent had maintained her application for the
position of Project Director and had requested to remain with
TDCA. Respondent soon was rehired by TDCA and assigned to another division of the agency. She received the
exact salary paid to the Project Director at PSC, and the subsequent promotions she has received have kept her salary and
responsibility commensurate with what she would have received had she been appointed Project Director.
Respondent filed this suit in the United States Distr:ct
Court for the Western District of Texas. She alleged that
the failure to promote and the subsequent decision to terminate her had been predicated on gender discrimination in
violation of Title VII. After a bench trial, the District Court
held that neither decision was based on gender discrimination.
The court relied on the testimony of Fuller that the employment decisions nece:;:sitated by the commands of the Department of Labor were based on consultation among trusted
1 Among the problems identified were overstaffing, lack of fiscal control,
poor bnokkeeping, lack of communication among PSC staff, and the lark
of a fnll-time project director . Letter of March 20, 1973 from Charles
Johnson to B. R. Fuller, reprinted in App., at 38-40.
2 See id., at 39.
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advisors and a nondiscriminatory evaluation of the relative
qualifications of the individuals involved. He testified that
the three individuals terminated did not work well together,
and that TDCA thought that eliminating this problem would
improve PSC's efficiency. The court accepted this explanation as rational and, in effect, found no evidence that the
decisions not to promote and to terminate respondent were
prompted by gender discrimination.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part.
608 F . 2d 563 (1979). The court held that the District
Court's "implicit evidentiary finding" that the male hired as
Project Director was better qualified for that position than
respondent was not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court
affirmed the District Court's finding that respondent was not
discriminated against when she was not promoted. The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court's finding that Fuller's testimony sufficiently had rebutted respondent's prima facie case of gender discrimination in the decision
to terminate her employment at PSC. The court reaffirmed
its previously announced views that the defendant in a Title
VII case bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
evidence the existence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons
for the employment action and that the defendant also must
prove by ob.iective evidence that those hired or promoted were
better qualified than the plaintiff. The court found that
Fuller's testimony did not carry either of these evidentiary
burdens. It, therefore, reversed the judgment of the District
Court and remanded the case for computation of backpay. 8
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the burden of proof borne by the defendant conflicts with interpretations of our precedents adopted by other courts of appeals,'
8 The Court of Appeals also vacated the District Court's judgment that
petitioner did not violate Title VII's equal pay provision , 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2 (h) , but that derision is not challenged here.
4 See, e. g. , Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F . 2d 60 (CA2 1980) ; Jackson v.
U. $. Steel Corp ., 624 F . 2d 436 · (CA3 1980) ; Ambush v. Montgomery

•
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we granted certiorari- U. S . - (1980). We now vacate
the Fifth Circuit's decision and remand for application of the
correct standard.
II
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973),
we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory
treatment. 5 First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by
the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." I d., at 802. Third. should the defendant
carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. I d., at 804.
The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant
should be understood in light of the plaintiff's ultimate and
intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading
the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all time with the plaintiff.
See Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439
U. S. 24, 25, n. 2 (1979); id., at 29 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
See generally 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2489 (3d ed. 1940) (the
burden of persuasion "never shifts~'). The McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves to
County Government, 22 FEP Cases 1101 (CA4 1980); Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F .2d 1003 (CAl 1979). But see Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp ., 620 F. Zd 655 (CAS 1980), cert. pending, No. 80--276.
5 We have recognized that the factual issues, and therefore the character
of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that n, facially
neutral employment policy has a discriminatory impact on protected
classes. See McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U. S., at 802, n. 14; TeamaterB 'V. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-336, and n. 15 (1971).
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bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to
this ultimate question.
The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate
treatment is not onerous. In the instant case, respondent had
to persuade the court by evidence that she was a qualified (
woman who sought an available position, but was rejected in
favor of a man. See McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 802.
The prima facie case serves an important function in the litigation: it eliminates the most common nondiscriminatory
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. As the Court explained
in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U. S. 567, 577
(1978), the prima facie case "raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration
of impermissible factors." Establishment of the prima facie
case in effect creates a presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the employer is
silent in the face of this presumption, the court must enter
judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact remains in
the case.
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to
rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was pref<>rred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons. See Sweeney, supra, at 25.
It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.0 To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set
6 This evidentiary relationship between the presumption created by a
prima facie case and the consequential burden of production placed on the
defendant is a traditional feature of the common law. "The word 'presumption' properly used refers only to a device for allocating the production burden." F. James & G. Hazard, Civil Procedure § 7.9, at 255
(2d Pd. 1977) (footnote omitted). See generally 9 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2491 (3d Ed. 1940) . Cf. J . Maguire, Evidence, Common Sense .and Com-
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forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the
reasons for the plaintiff's rejection. 7 The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the
defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of production, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted,8 and the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of
specificity. Placing this burden of production on the defendant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and
to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the
plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext. The sufficiency of the defendant's evidence should
be evaluated by the extent to which it fulfills these functions.
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered
reason was not the true reason for the employment decision.
This burden now merges with the ultimate burden of persuadmon Law, 185-186 (1947). Usually, assessing the burden of production
helps the judge determine whether the litigants have created an issue of
fact to be decided by the jury. In a Title VII case, the allocation of
burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima
facie case is intended progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive
factual question of intentional discrimination.
7 An articulation not adinitted into evidence wiU not suffice. Thus, the
defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to the complaint or by argument. of counsel.
8 Sec generally J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatil:ie on Evidence 34B (1898).
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not mean to
imply that inferences of discrimination or intent suggested by the plaintiff's evidence are impermissible. We m<>rely sny that such inferences are
no longer mandatory ttfter the defendtmt has given a legally sufficient
explanation for his action. The plaintiff's evidence and its pem1issible
inferences then should be evaluated in the context of the total evidence
on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual. Thus,
there ma.y be cases where thP plaintiff'l:i initial evidence, perhaps combined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will el:ital~lisl~ pretext without the plaintiff presenting a fomHtl rebuttal of the defendall't's
(}Xpianation.

I
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ing the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.
See McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 804-805.

III
In reversing the judgment of the District Court that the
discharge of respondent from PSC was unrelated to her sex,
the Court of Appeals adhered to two rules it had developed
to elaborate the defendant's burden of proof. First, the defendant must prove by a preponderence of the evidence that
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge existed.
608 F. 2d, at 567. See Turner v. Texas instruments, Inc., 555
F. 2d 1251, 1255 (CA5 1977) .. Second, to satisfy this burden,
the defendant "must prove that those he hired . . . were
somehow better qualified than was plaintiff; in other words,
comparative evidence is needed." 608 F. 2d, at 567 (emphasis in original). See East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F. 2d 332,
339-340 (CA5 1975).
A

The Court of Appeals has misconstrued the nature of the
burden that McDonnell Douglas and its progeny place on the
defendant. See Part II, supra. We stated in Sweeney that
"the employer's burden is satisfied if he simply 'explains what
he has done' or 'produc[ es] evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.' " 439 U. S., at 25, n. 2, quoting id.,
at 28, 29 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). It is plain that the Court
of Appeals required much more: it placed on the defendant
the burden of persuading the court that it had convincing, /
objective reasons for preferring the chosen applicant above
the plaintiff. 0
9 The
court reviewed the defendant's evidence and explained its
deficiency:
('Defendant failed to introduce comparative factual data concerning
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The Court of Appeals distinguished Sweeney on the ground /
that the case held only that the defendant did not have the
burden of proving the absence of discriminatory intent. But
this distinction slights the rationale of Sweeney and of our
other cases. We have stated consistently that the employee's
prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the employer articulates lawful reasons for the action; that is, to
satisfy this intermediate burden, the employer need only produce admissible evidence which, in the absence of any evidence of pretext, would allow the trier of fact rationally to
conclude that the employment decision had not been motivated by discriminatory animus. · The Court of Appeals
would require the defendant to introduce evidence which, in
the absence of any evidence of pretext, would persuade the
trier of fact that the employment action was lawful. This
exceeds what properly can be demanded to satisfy a burden
of production.
The court placed the burden of persuasion on the defendant apparently because it feared that "[i]f an employer need
only articulate-not prove-a legitimate. nondisrriminatorv
reason for his action, he may compose fictitious, but legitimate, reasons for his actions." Turner v. Texas Instruments,
Inc., supra, at 1255 (emphasis in original). We do not believe, however, that limiting the defendant's evidentiary obligation to a burden of production will unduly hinder the plainBurdine and Walz. Fuller merdy testified that he discharged and retained personnel in the spring shakeup at TDCA primarily on the recommendations of subordinates and that he considered Walz qualified for the
position he was retained to do. Fuller failed to specify any objective
criteria on which he based the decision to discharge Burdine and retain
W lz. He stated only that the action was in the best interest of the
program and that there had been some friction within the department that
might be alleviated by Burdine's discharge. Nothing in the record indicates whether he examined Walz' ability to work well with others. This
court in East found such unsubstantiated assertions of "qualification" and
"prior work record" insufficient absent data that will allow a true compal'ison of the individuals hired and rejected." 608 F. 2d, at 568.
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tiff. First, as noted above, the defendant's explanation of its
legitimate reasons must be clear and reasonably specific.
Supra, at 5- 6. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F. 2d 1003,
1011-l012, n. 5 (CAl 1979). This obligation arises both from
the necessity of rebutting the inference of discrimination arising from the prima facie case and from the requirement that
the plaintiff be afforded "a full and fair opportunity" to
demonstrate pretext. Second, although the defendant does
not bear a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant nevertheless retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact that
the employment decision was lawful. Thus, the defendant
normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its explanation. Third , the liberal discovery rules applicable to any
civil suit in federal court are supplemented in a Title VII suit
by the plaintiff's access to the Equal Employment Opportunity
CommiEsion's investigatory files concerning her complaint. /
U. S. See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., (1981). Given these factors. we are unpersuaded that the
plaintiff will find it pa.rticularly difficult to prove that a proffered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext. We
remain confident that the McDonnell Douglas framework
permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination.
B
The Court of Appeals also erred in requiring the defendant
to prove by objective evidence that the person hired or
promoted was more qualified than the plaintiff. McDonnell
Douglas teaches that it is the plaintiff's task to demonstrate
that similarly situated employees were not treated equally.
411 U. S., at 804. The Court of Appeals' rule would require
the employer to show that the plaintiff's objective qualifications were inferior to those of the person selected. If
it cannot, a court would, in effect, conclude that it has
discriminated.
The court's procedural rule harbors a substantive error.
Title VII prohibits all discrimination in employment based
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upon race, sex and national origin. "The broad, overriding
interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is effi~
cient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair
and ... neutral employment and personnel decisions." M cDonnel Douglas, supra, at 801. Title VII, however, does not
demand that an employer give preferential treatment to minorities or women. 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (j) . See Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 205-206 (1979). · The statute was not intended to "diminish traditional management
prerogatives." Id., at 207. It does not require the employer
to restructure his employment practices to maximize the number of minorities and women hired. Furnco Construction Co.
v. Waters, 438 U.S., at 577-578.
The views of the Court of Appeals can be read, we think, as
requiring the employer to hire the minority or female applicant whenever that person's objective qualifications were
equal to those of a white male applicant. But Title VII does
not obligate an employer to accord this preference. Rather,
the employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria. The fact that a court may think that the
employer misjudged the qualifications of the applicants does
not in itself expose him to Title VII liability, although this
may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., supra, at
1012, n. 6; see Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60, 65 (CA2'
1980).

IV
In summary, the Court of Appeals erred by requiring the
defendant to prove by a preponderence of the evidence the
existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating the
respondent and that the person retained in her stead had
superior obj ective qualificatiops for the position. 1 When the
Q
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BP rau ~e

~vide:nee,

the Court of Appeall:l t pplied the wrong legal standard to the·
llO occasion to decide whether it erred in not review-

we. have
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plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the
defendant bears only the burden of explaining clearly the
nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is vacated and the case is remanded for
fprther proceedin~§ cgnsistent with this opinion.

It

is so ordered,

ing the District Court's finding of no intentional discrimination under
the "clearly erroneous'' standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a).
Addressing this issue in this case would be inappropriate because the
District Court made no findings on the intermediate questions posed by

McDonneU Douglas..

lfp/ss

1/26/81

Burdine, Rider A

The applicable standard was stated in general terms in
McDonnell-Douglas, supra, at 802.6

This tandard was not

intended to be an inflexible rule, as "[t]he facts
necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the
specification .•• of the prima facie proof required from
respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect in
differing factual situations.""

Furnco Construction Corp.

v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978).

In this case, the

fourth element of the standard is inapplicable as the
position in question was filled with a white applicant.
Thus, plaintiff here needed only to prove to establish a
prima facie case that she was a qualified woman, duly
applied and was qualified for the position to be filled, and
6. Peter: Here copy the McDonnell-Douglas standard - all
four parts.

,...

~..

" .

~

2.

- despite her qualifications - she was rejected in favor of
a man.

At this stage of this case, as in many other cases,

these may be the only facts available to the plaintiff.

A

Title VII plaintiff carries the initial burden of showing
actions taken by the employer from which one can infer, if
such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than
not that such actions were "based on a nondiscriminatory
criterion illegal under the Act".
States, 431

u.s.

Teamsters v. United

324, 358 (1977); Furnco Construction Corp.

v. Waters, supra, at 576.

The prima facie case serves an

important function in the litigation:

it eliminates the

most common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's
rejection.

Establishment of such a case in effect creates a

presumption that the employer unlawfully discriminated
against the employee.

If the employer remains silent in the

face of this presumption, the Court normally should enter

3•

judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of fact will
remain in the case.

Note to Peter:

Take a look at the above reformulation of

the first full paragraph on page 5 of our opinion.

This

paragraph has continued to give Justice Stevens some
trouble, and - as you know - has raised some questions in my
mind.

The principal question is whether our paragraph as

presently written can be viewed as stating a standard

~~

some ~

differently from the way it was articulated in McDonnellDouglas and reiterated in subsequent cases.

Accordingly, I

have tried - in the above revision - to quote literally from
the prior cases, although I end up where we were originally.
We can talk about this upon my return on Tuesday.

~tqtrtmt ~qmt 4tf tlrt 'Jftnitth ~hrlt.\l
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 19, 1981

Re:

79-1764 - Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine

Dear Lewis:
There are several aspects of your opinion
describing the three-stage procedure in a Title VII
case that concern me. Let me raise the points
separately:
1.

Do you intend to lessen the plaintiff's
burden of making a prima facie case? As I
had understood McDonell Douglas, it required
evidence on behalf of the plaintiff that gave
rise to an inference that an employment
decision had been made for a discriminatory
reason. The second full sentence on page 5
of your opinion, however, implies that every
time two qualified applicants for a vacancy
are of a different race or sex, the one who
does not get the job automatically has a
~rna facie case.
It would seem to me that
-,:here might be two qualified applicants who
sought employment at the same time and the
employer simply took one rather than the
other. In that situation, I would not think
a prima facie case would have been made out
because there would be no basis for an
inference that the gender of the applicant
had anything to do with the employment
decision. In the McDonell Douglas
hypothesis, on the contrary, the fact that a
qualified applicant was rejected and
thereafter the employer continued to
1n erv1ew other persons and ultimately hired
one of the opposite sex would give rise to
~ch an inference.
In other words, I think
eLement of the plaintiff's prima facie
case is some fact giving rise to an inference

I

an

- 2 -

that the employment decision was not made on
neutral cr i t:_e: ia.
h J · • ..,HJ., ~# ~...
,

2.

..,

,;

:Y /k~

I question whether you are correct in stating
on page 5 that if the employer fails to put
on any evidence at all, "the Court must enter
judgment for the plaintiff because no issue
of fact remains in the case." It seems to me
that there may well be cases in which the
plaintiff's testimony may not be considered
credible by the judge. For example, one
could suppose a ninety-five pound person
testifying that he was qualified for a
position as a heavy-weight boxer and nothing
in the written record would dispute what he
had to say but the judge might simply
disbelieve him. I would think that a
defendant would have no obligation to put on
any evidence and counsel could simply argue
that even though a prima facie case had been
made which required that the issue of fact be
submitted to the trier-of-fact, nevertheless,
the inference of discriminatory motive was so
obviously unworthy of belief that judgment
should be entered for the defendant. In
)
other words, I believe there is a distinction (
between the requirement that a prima facie
case be submitted to the trier-of-fact and
one requiring that judgment be entered in
favor of the plaintiff.

j

3.

Because the word "articulated" has given rise
to some misunderstanding, I wonder if it
would not be wise to make it clear that the
word is intended to have reference to
evidence admitted at the trial and definitely
would not include a mere articulation by
counsel or by an answer to a discovery
request. Perhaps this is already obvious I
but I would be happier if you could see fit
to make the point expressly.

3

4.

I am not sure I entirely understand the socalled third stage of the case, in which the
plaintiff is permitted to demonstrate that

o1"-

- 3 -

the defendant's explanation for the
employment decision was pretextual. As I
read the opinion, it seems to require the
plaintiff to put on some additional rebuttal
evidence in every case in which the defendant
has put on some evidence explaining its
action. Does this mean that if the plaintiff
puts on all the evidence that is available in
his prima facie case in order to make sure
that an inference of discrimination has been
established and then the defendant comes
forward with an explanation of neutral
reasons which conflicts in some respects with
the plaintiff's evidence, that the defendant
must prevail unless the plaintiff puts on
further evidence? It would seem to me that
there could well be situations in which a
)
combination of plaintiff's original case and
effective cross-examination of the
defendant's witnesses is adequate to
'
~establish pretext, and that plaintiff would
~ p~
have nothing further to say in rebuttal.
(~ -- .
E'(en without_. any r:ebut t~, the trial judge
tl.-. "i
might be convinced that the plaintiff was
telling the truth and that the defendant's
,
~
estimony was entirely unworthy of belief.
~
n that situation the plaintiff should
J ~
prevail but, as I read your opinion, it seems
to imply the contrary. i'Lb

n

5.

Finally, and perhaps because I disagree with
the decision in EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods
Corp., I am not entirely happy about relying
on any special liberal discovery rule in a
Title VII case as a justification for a
procedure that would be different from that
which should prevail in any other lawsuit.

11

Respectfully,
Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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January 19, 1981

CHAMI!IERS OF

JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN

Re: No. 79-1764 - Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine
Dear Lewis:
You have written a very persuasive opinion, and I am
glad to join it.
Sincerely,

~tit!.

Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference

.·""'""'

January 21, 1981

79-1764

Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine

Dear John:
Thank you for your comments on my opinion. I do
not think we are far apart on any one of your points.
Points 1 and 2: I do not intend to lessen the
plaintiff's burden of making a prima facie case. To make
this clearer, I am changing the language in the second
sentence of the first full paragraph on page 5 to read as
follows:
•In the instant case, respondent had to
persuade the Court by evidence that she was a
qualified woman who sought an available
position, but was rejected in favor of a
man. •
As noted, proof that the complainant was qualified for the
position is likely to eliminate the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for failing to hire or promote.
We are talking only about an •inference of discrimination•
that requires the defendant to come forward with a neutral
explanation. Part III B makes clear that the plaintiff does
not win merely by showing he or she was equally qualified.
Point 3: I certainly wish to make clear that a
defendant must discharge his burden by introducing evidence.
Indeed, the word evidence is used four time on pages 5 and 6
in describing the defendant's burden. In view of your
concern, I am glad to add a footnote along the following
lines:
•An articulation not admitted into
evidence will not suffice. Thus, the
defendant cannot meet its burden merely
through an answer to the complaint or an
argument by counsel.•

·""-'""-"'---'---------~~~----·~·.

.~·'

.. .

~

..

2.

Point 4: As I think your point is well taken, I
am adding a sentence at the end of footnote 7 on page 6 as
follows:
"Thus, there may be cases where the
plaintiff's initial evidence, perhaps
combined with effective cross exmaination of
the defendant, will establish pretext without
the plaintiff presenting a formal rebuttal of
the defendant's explanation.•
Point 5: I join you in disagreeing with the
Court's recent decision in Associated Dry Goods Corp., but I
suppose this is now the law.
I have sent these changes to the printer and will
recirculate a second draft. As four Justices have joined
me, I will - of course - have to respect their views. As I
consider my changes to be clarifications rather than
substantive. I would not expect objections.
Sincerely,

Mr. Justice Stevens
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.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS

January 22, 1981
Re:

79-1764 - Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine

Dear Lewis:
Thank you for your response to my letter of
January 19, 1981. All of your changes are improvements
and you surely have satisfied my points 3 and 4 and I
will withdraw my point 5. I regret to say, however,
that I am still concerned about points 1 and 2.
First, the facts (1) that an applicant is
qualified and (2) that a person of the opposite sex was
hired, do not in my judgment give rise to an inference
of discrimination. Two years ago I rejected a
qualified male applicant and hired a female as a law
clerk; this year I rejected two qualified females and
hired two qualified males. I do not believe that those
facts as applied to either year viewed separately were
sufficient to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination, yet under your opinion they are
sufficient.
Second, I am still not persuaded that an
unrebutted prima facie case always requires that
judgment be entered in favor of the plaintiff. I would
agree with the last sentence of the full paragraph on
page 5 if it were modified as follows:
"If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's
evipence, and if the employer is silent in the
facl of this presumption, the Court must enter
judgment for the plaintiff because no issue of
fact remains in the case."
Respectfully,

Mr. Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference
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January 27, 1981

No. 79-1764, Texas Department of Community Affairs
v. Burdine

Dear Lewis:
I can join, but I do have one suggestion.
John has been concerned that language in the
present draft indicates an unrebutted prima facie case
calls for a judgment for the plaintiff. I am concerned
with the opposi~ap~l~m: that footnote 8 in its
present form coul
read to suggest that, despite the
defendant's rebuttal, discriminatory intent may be
inferred even if the plaintiff does not persuade the
' trier of fact that the explanation advanced by the
defendant is a pretext. In context this reading is
~- ~
~
unpersuasive, but I wish you would conside1-4
~y
1
clarification along the following tines, to be added
after ~cite to Thayer. I advance the language only
to make clear what I have in mind:
~ - -·~~"~:r:."r~l';~<~
'

I

"In saying that the presumption droPs frotn the ~~· ~1-t~~(
case, we do not mea:f'l tg. / impl-y that the tt ier of
~
~act must reject as u
rustworthy evidence
preViOUSly intrOdU a by -i¥e plaintiff jto make a
y L_/ I I
prima fa~ie case
~he trier may~ ~ take
-,
that evide~e in o account in deciding whether the
lanatio~~the defendant a~anees is a pretext.
say only that once the defendant has rebutted
plaintiff's prima facie case 13y comi.A-S fo:r;ward
w~th ~~eenaa~~' discrimination
is not to be inferred unless the plaintiff
~4 A~-- A_
1
.P.ersuades the trier . that theee~ reasons are
-~~
preteXQ. The plaintiff nonetheless may argue
pretextN based in whole or in part on the same
evidence introduced to demonstrate a prima facie
case should that evidence be probative." {

.a-..: .

Regards,

Mr. Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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.J . BRENNAN, .JR.

RE:

No. 79-1764

2!lgt,.,

January 29, 1981

Affairs v. Burdine

Dear Lewis:
I believe that a part oft~ confusion concerning the effect of
the plaintiff's establishment;rf a prima facie case in the Title VII
context is that the phrase " Hma facie case" ordinarily means that
th~eintiff has made out
case sufficient to go to the jury, i.e.,
suff cient to permit the act-ftnder to draw the desired inference.
Se C. McCormick, Hand ok of the Law of Evidence, at 640 (1954). In
the Title VII context, as your proposed opinion indicates, when the
plaintiff has proven 'her "prima fatie case" by a preponderance of the
evidence, the fact-finder is required to draw the desired inference
of discriminatory intent, unless the defendant bears his burden of
articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged
action. The use of the phrase "prima facie case" in McDonnell Douglas
is therefore somewhat misleading. Recognizing that my suggestions
differ to some extent from those offered by John, I nevertheless
suggest that the following alterations would serve to clarify the
matter:
(1) In the first paragraph, second sentence, to change "after the
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case," which might merely imply o-7'(
that she has alleged facts sufficient to establish a case, to "after
the plaintiff has proven a prima facie case. .
"
(2) After the second sentence of Part II, on page 4, to add a
footnote along these lines:
In the Title VII context, the phrase "prima facie case"
does not merely denote the plaintiff's burden of producing
enough evidence to permit the fact-finder to infer discriminatory intent; rather, the prima facie case, if proved, requires such inference, unless the defendant aritculates a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action.

- 2 -

( 3) On page 5, to insert the phrase, 11 a preponderance of the 11
between the words 11 bY 11 and 11 evidence 11 in the second sentence, and
to insert the word 11 mandatory 11 before the word 11 presumption 11 in the
penultimate sentence.
(4) On page 8, to delete the phrase 11 in the absence of any evidence of pretext 11 from the third sentence of the first paragraph.
Sincerely,

// '

Au
Mr. Justice Powell
cc: The Conference
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 79-1764
Texas Department of Community) On Writ of Certiorari to
Affairs, Petitioner,
the United States Court
v.
of Appeals for the Fifth
Joyce Ann Burdine.
' Circuit.
[January -, 1981]
JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case requires us to address again the nature of the
evidentiary burden placed upon the defendant in an employment discrimination suit brought under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S. C.§ 2000e et seq. Thenarrow question presented is whether, after the plaintiff has
proved a prima facie case of discriminatory treatment, the
burden shifts to the defendant to persuade the court by a
preponderance of the evidence that legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged employment action existed.

I
Petitioner, the Texas Department of Community Affairs
(TDCA), hired respondent, a female, in January 1972, for
the position of accounting clerk in the Public Service Careers
Division (PSC). PSC provided training and employment
opportunities in the public sector for unskilled workers.
When hired , respondent possessed several years' experience in
employment training. She was promoted to Field Services
Coordinator in July 1972. Her supervisor resigned in November of that year, and respondent was assigned additional
duties. Although she applied for the supervisor's position of
Project Director, the position remained vacant for six months.
PSC was funded completely by the United States Depart-
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ment of Labor. The Department was seriously concerned
about inefficiencies at PSC. 1 In February, 1973, the Department notified the Executive Director of TDCA, B. R. Fuller,
that it would terminate PSC the following month. TDCA
officials, assisted by respondent, persuaded the Department to
continue funding the program, conditioned upon PSC reforming its operations. Among the agreed conditions were
the appointment of a permanent Project Director and a complete reorganization of the PSC staff. 2
After consulting with personnel within TDCA, Fuller hired
a male from another division of the agency as Project Director. In reducing the PSC staff, he fired r ~spondent along
with two other employees, and retained another male, Walz, as
the only professional employee in the division. It is undisputed that respondent had maintained her application for the
position of Project Director and had requested to remain with
TDCA. Respondent soon was rehired by TDCA and assigned to another division of the agency. She received the
exact salary paid to the Project Director at PSC, and the subsequent promotions she has received have kept her salary and
responsibility commensurate with what she would have received had she been appointed Project Director.
Respondent filed this suit in the United States Distr:ct
Court for the Western District of Texas. She alleged that
the failure to promote and the subsequent decision to terminate her had been predicated on gender discrimination in
violation of Title VII. After a bench trial, the District Court
held that neither decision was based on gender discrimination.
The court relied on the testimony of Fuller that the employment decisions necessitated by the commands of the Depart1 Among the problems identified were overstaffing, Jack of fiscal control,
poor b ~ okkecping , lack of communication among PSC staff, and the lack
of a full-time project director. Letter of March 20, 1973 from Charles:
,Johnson to B. R. Fuller, reprinted in App., at 38-40.
2 See id., at 39 .

..

..
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ment of Labor were based on consultation among trusted
advisors and a nondiscriminatory evaluation of the relative
qualifications of the individuals involved. He testified that
the three individuals terminated did not work well together,
and that TDCA thought that eliminating this problem would
improve PSC's efficiency. The cou;t accepted this explanation as rational and, in effect, found no evidence that the
decisions not to promote and to terminate respondent were
prompted by gender discrimination.
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed in part.
608 F. 2d 563 (1979). The court held that the District
Court's "implicit evidentiary finding" that the male hired as
Project Director was better qualified for that position than
respondent was not Clearly erroneous. Accordingly, the court
affirmed the District Court's finding that respondent was not
discriminated against when she was not promoted. The
Court of Appeals, however, reversed the District Court's finding that Fuller's testimony sufficiently had rebutted respondent's prima facie case of gender discrimination in the decision
to terminate her employment at PSC. The court reaffirmed
its previously announced views that the defendant in a Title
VII case bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the
·evidence the existence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons
for the employment action and that the defendant also must
prove by objective evidence that those hired or promoted were
better qualified than the plaintiff. The court found that
Fu1ler's testimony did not carrv either of these eviden tiarv
burdens. It, therefore, reversed the judgment of the District
Court and remanded the case for computation of backpay.it
Because the decision of the Court of Appeals as to the · burden of proof borne by the defendant conJlicts with interpretations of our precedents adopted by other courts of appeals,•
• The Court of Appeals also vacated the District Court 's judgment that
petitioner did not violate Title VII 's equal pa:v provision, 42 U. S. C.
§ 2000e-2 (h) , but that decision is not chaliE'nged here.
4 See, e. g., Lieberman v. Gant , 630 F . 2d 60 (CA2 1980) ; Jackson· v.
U. S. Steel Corp ., 624 F . 2d 436 (CA3 1980) ; Ambush v. Montgomew

..
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we granted certiorari- U. S . - (1980). We now vacate
the Fifth Circuit's decision and remand for application of the
correct standard.
II
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) ,
we set forth the basic allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging discriminatory
treatment. 5 First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving by
the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. Second, if the plaintiff succeeds in proving the
prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." !d., at 802. Third, should the defendant
carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an opportunity
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true
reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. I d., at 804.
The nature of the burden that shifts to the defendant
should be understood in light of the plaintiff's ultimate and
intermediate burdens. The ultimate burden of persuading
the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated
against the plaintiff remains at all time with the plaintiff.
See Board of Trustees of Keene State College v. Sweeney, 439
U. S. 24, 25, n. 2 (1979); id., at 29 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
See generally 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2489 (3d ed. 1940) (the
burden of persuasion "never shifts"). The McDonnell Douglas division of intermediate evidentiary burdens serves tO'
County Government, 22 FEP -Cases 1101 (CA4 1980) ; Loeb v. Textron,
Inc., 600 F .2d 1003 (CAl 1979) . But see Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 620 F. 2d 655 (CAS 1980), cert. pending, No. 8~276 .
II We have recognized that the factual issues, and therefore the character
of the evidence presented, differ when the plaintiff claims that a facially
neutral employment policy has a discriminatory impact on protected'
classes. See McDonnell Douglas, supra, 411 U. S., at 802, n. 14; Teamaters v. United States, 431 U. S. 324, 335-336, and n. 15 (1977) .

,,
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bring the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to
this ultimate question.
The burden of establishing a prima facie case of disparate
treatment is not onerous. The plaintiff must prove by a
proponderence of the evidence that she applied for an avail~
able position, for which she was qualified, but was rejected
under circumstances which gl.ve rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination. 6 The prima facie case serves an important
function in the litigation: it eliminates the most common
nondiscriminatory reasons for the piaintiff's rejection. See
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 & n. 44 (1977).
As the Court explained in Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters,
438 U. S. 5G7, 577 ( 1978), the prima facie case "raises an
inference of discrimination oniy because we presume these
acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based
on the consideration of impermissible factors." Establish~
ment of the prima facie ca~ in effect creates a presumption
that the employer unlawfully discriminated against the em~
ployee. If the trier of fact believes the plaintiff's evidence,
and if the employer is silent in the face of the presumption,
In MrDonnell Douglas, supra. we described an a.ppropriate model for
a prima facie case of racial discrimination. The plaintiff must show:
"(i) that he belongs to a racial minority ; (ii) tha.t he applied and was
qualified for a jrb for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that , despite his qualification, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after
his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to
seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications ." 411 U. S.,
at 802.
We added, however, that this standard is not inflexible, as "[t]he facts
necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification above
of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect in differing factual situations." !d., at 802, n. 13.
In the instant case, it is not seriously contested that respondent has
11roved a prima facie rase. She showed that she was a qualified woman
who sought an available position, but the position was left open for several
months bdore she finally was rejected in favor of a male who had been
under her supervision .
6
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the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because nQ
issue of fact remains in the case. 7
The burden that shifts to the defendant, therefore, is to
rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected, or someone else was pre•
ferred, for a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The de-.
fendant need not persuade the court that it was actually mo..
tivated by the proffered reasons. See Sweeney, supra, at 25.
It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine
issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against the plaintiff.8 To accomplish this, the defendant must clearly set
forth, through the introduction of admissible evidence, the
reasons for the plaintiff;s rejection. 9 The explanation provided must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the
defendant. If the defendant carries this burden of produc7 The phrase "prima facie case" may dE:'note not only the establishment
of a legally mandatory, rE:'buttabl.E:' prE:'sumption, but also may be used by
courts to describe the plaintiff's burden of producing enough evidence to
permit the trier of fact to infer th~ fact at issue. 9 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2494 (3d ed. 1940). McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent
that in the Title VII context we use "prima facie case" in the former
5ense.
8 This evidentiary relntion::<hip betwePn thr pre:;umption erE"<~ ted by a
prima facie case and the consequential burden of production placed on the
defendant is a traditional feature of the common law. "The word 'presumption' properly used refers only to a ·device for allocating the production burden." F. James & G. Hazard, civil Procedure § 7.9, at 255
(2d ed. 1::J77) (footnote omittrd). See Fed . H!Jie Evid. 301. See gener- \
ally 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2491 (ad Ed . 1940). Cf. J. Maguire, Evidence, Common SenHe and Common Law, 185-186 (1947) . Usually, assr,;...,ing the burdt>n of production help:-; thr judge determinr whether the
litigants havt> created an i~;sur of fact to br decided by tlw jury. In a
Title VII rase, the allocation of burdens and the creation of a pre:;umption
by the e:;tabliohment of a prima facie casr is intendt>d progre::<:;ively to
sharpen the inquiry into the eluoivc factual que:;tion of intentional
di;;criminntion.
9 An articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice.
Thus, the
defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to the complaint or by argument of counsel.
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tion, the presumption raised by the prima facie case is rebutted/0and the factual inquiry proceds to a new level of
~pecificity. Placing this burden of production on the defend~
ant thus serves simultaneously to meet the plaintiff's prima
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and
to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the
plaintiff will have a fuli and fair opportunity to demonstrate
pretext. The sufficiency o.f the defendant's evidence should
be evaluated by the extent to which it fuifills these functions.
The plaintiff retains the burden of persuasion. She now
must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the proffered
reason was not the true reason for. the employment decision.
This burden now merges with the ultimate· burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination. She may succ_eed in this either directly by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer .or indirectly by showing that the
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.
See McDonnell Douglas, supra, at 804-805.

III
In reversing the judgment of the District Court that the
discharge of respondent _from. PSC was . unrelated to her sex~
the Court of Appeals adhered to, two rules it had developed
to elaborate the defendant's burden of proof. First, the defendant must prove by a preponderence of the evidence that
J. Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence 346 ( 1898).
In saying that the presumption drops from the case, we do not imply that
the trier of fact no longer may consider evidence previously introduced by
the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case. A satisfactory explanation by
the defendant destroys the legally mandatory inference of discrimination
arising from the plaintiff's initial evidence. Nonetheless, this evidence
and inferences properly drawn therefrom may be considered by the trier
of fact on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual.
.Indeed, there may be some cases where the palintiff's initial evidence, combined with effective cross-examination of the defendant, will suffice to
'discredit the defendant's expalnation.
• 1o See generally
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legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the discharge existed.
608 F. 2d, at 567. See Turner v. Texa.s Instruments, Inc., 555
F. 2d 1251, 1255 (CA5 1977). Second, to satisfy this burden,
the defendant "must prove that those he hired . . . were
somehow better qualified than was plaintiff; in other words,
comparative evidence is needed." 608 F. 2d, at 567 (empha,.,
sis in original). See East v. Romine, Inc., 518 F. 2d 332,
339- 340 (CA5 1975).

A
The Court of Appeals has misconstrued the nature of the
burcl.en that McDonnell Douglas and its progeny place on the
ddcndant. See Part II, supra. We stated in Sweeney that
"the employer's burden is satisfied if he simply 1explains what
he has done' or 1 produc[es] evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons.'" 439 U. S., at 25, n. 2, quoting id.,
at 28, 29 (STEVENS, J., dissenting). It is plain that the Court
of Appeals required much more: it placed on the defendant
the burden of persuading the court that it had convincing,
objective reasons for preferring the chosen applicant above
the plaintiff. 11
The Court of Appeals distinguished Sweeneu on the ground
that the case held only that the defendant did not have the
11

The court review the defendant's evidence and explained its
'deficiency:
"Defendant failed to introduce comparative factual data concerning
Burdine and Walz. Fuller merely testified that he discharged and retained personnel in the spring shakeup at TbCA primarily on the recommendations of subordinates and that he considered' 'walz qualified for the
position he was retained to do . Fuiier failed to specify any objective
criteria on which he based the decision to discharge Burdine and retain
Walz . He stated only that the action was in the best interest of the
program and that t'here had been scme friction within the department that
might be allel'iated by Burdine's discharge. Nothing in the record indicates whether he examined Walz' ability to work well with others. This
court in Ea.st found such unsubstantiated assertions of "qualifiratlon;, and
"prior work record" insufficient absent data. that will allow a true companson of the individuals hired and rejected ." 608 F. 2d, at 568 .

..
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burden of proving the absence of discriminatory intent. Bu~
this distinction slights the rationale of Sweeney and of om
other cases. We have stated consistently that the employee's
prima facie case of discrimination will be rebutted if the em~
ployer articulates lawful reasons for the action; that is, to
satisfy this intermediate burden, the _emp~oyer need only pro~
duce admissible eviqence which wo~ld allow the trier of fact
rationally to conclude that the employment decision had not
been motivated by discriminatory_ animus. The Court of Ap~
peals would require the defendant to introduce evidence
which , in the absence of any evidence_ of pretext, would
persuade the trier of fact that the employment action was
lawful. This exceeds what properly can be demanded to
satisfy a burden of production.
The court placed the b~rden .of persuasion on the defend 7
ant apparently because it feared that "[i] f an employer need
only articulate-not prove-a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for his action, he may compose fictitious, but legitimate, reasons for hjs actions." Turner v. Texas Instruments,
Inc., supra, at 1255 .(emphasis in original). We do not believe, however, that limit~ng the defendant's evidentiary obligation to a burden of production will unduly hil)der the plaintiff. First, as noted above, the defendant's explanation of its
lPgitimate reasons must be r,lear and reasonably soecifi9.
Supra, at 5-6. See Loeb v. Textro~. Inc., 600 F. 2d 1003,
1011-1012. n. 5 (CAl 1979). This obligation arises both from
the necessity of rebutting the inference of discrimination arising from the prima fade case and from the requirement that
the plaintiff be afforded "a . full and fair opportunity" to
demonstrate pretext. Second, although the . defendant does
not bear a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant never-theless retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact that
the emolovment decision was lawful. Thus, the defendant
normally will attempt to prove the factual basis for its expla~
'n,ation. Third, the liberal discovery rules applicable to any
dvil suit in federal court are supplemented in a Title VII suit
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by the plaintiff's access to the Equal Ernployment Opportunity
Commission's investigatory files concerning her complaint:
See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods Corp., U. S. ___:.:.
{ 1981). Given these factors, we are unpersuaded that the
plaintiff will find it particularly difficult to prove that a proffered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext. We
remain confident that the jlfcDonnell Douglas framework
permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination.
B
The Court of Appe~ls ttlso erred in requiring the defendant
to prove by objective evidence that the person hired or
promoted was more qualified than the pJaintiff. M cDonneli
Douglas teaches that it is the piaintiff's task to demonstrate
that similarly situated empioyees were not treated equally,
411 U. S., at 804. The Court of Appeais' rule would require
the employer to show that the plaintiff's objective qualifi:
cations were inferior to those of the person selected. If
it cannot, a court would, in effect, conclude that it has
discriminated.
. The court's procedural rule harbors a substantive error.
Title VII prohibits all discrimination in employment based
upon race, sex and national origin. "The broad, overridin§
interest, shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is e~ 7
cient and trustworthy workmanship assured through fair
and ... neutral employment and-.plilrsonnel decisions." Me-::
Donnel Douglas, supra, at 801. Title VII,. however, does not
demand that an employer give preferential treatment to minorities or women. 42 U. S. C. §.2000e- 2 (j). See Steel-:
workers v. Weber, 443 U. S. 193, 205-206 (1979). The stat..
ute was not intended to "diminish traditional management
prerogatives." !d., at· 207. It does not require the employer
to restructure his employment practices to maximize the num;r
ber·of minorities and women hired. Furnco Construction Co:
Waters, 438 U. S., at 577-578.
I

v.

I'
' I

,,
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The views of the Court of Appeals can be read, we think, a~
requiring the employer to hire the minority or female appli:
cant whenever that person's objective qualifications were
equal to those of a white male applicant. But Title VII does
not obligate an employer to accord this preference. Rather 1
the employer has discretion to choose among equally qualified candidates, provided the decision is not based upon unlawful criteria . . The fact that a court may think that the
employer misjudged the qu~iifications of the applicants does
not in itself expose him to Title VII_hability, although this
may be probative of whether the employer's reasons are pretexts for discrimination. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., supra, at
1012, n. 6; see Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F. 2d 60, 65 (CA2
1980).

IV
In summary, the Court of Appeals erred by requiring the
defendant to prove by a preponderence of the evidence the
existence of nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating the
respondent and that the person retained in her stead had
superior objective qualifications for the position. 12 When the
plaintiff has proved a prima facie case of discrimination, the
defendant bears only the . burden of explaining clearly th~
nondiscriminatory _reasons for its actions. The judgment of
the Court of Appeals is .vacated and the c~se is remanded for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.

Because the Court of Appeals applied the wrong legal standard to the
evidence, we have no occasion to decide whether it erred in not reviewing the District Court's finding of no intentiopal discrimination under
the "clearly erroneous'' standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 (a).
Addressing this issue in this case would be inappropriate because the
District Court made no findings on the intermediate questions posed by
12

McDonneU Douglas.
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Dear Lewis:
I join.
Regards,

Justice Powell
Copies to the Conference
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This case -i s here on certiorari to the

. ~ al

A

Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
It involves the proper evidenti~ burden,/ born by
an employer,; 'in a discrimination suit brought under Title

VI ~f

the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Court of Appeals

hel~hat

when a discharged

employ~ proves a prima facie case of discrimination,~the
employ.:E then must prove }
evidencjl- that
Court further

by a preponderence of the

n~ndiscriminatory reasons existed.

hel~t

the employ![ also must

the person retained in the position-a t

The

prov~hat

issue~as better

-

qualified than the rejected employee.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among
the circuit;Jas to the appropriate burden of proof;{o rebut
a prima fac1e case of discrimination.

-

Our prior cases have held that the employer's

burden~is to identify clearly - by evidence - a legitimate,;
nondiscriminatory reason/ for the employment decision.
is merely a burden of going forward with evidence.

The

This

2.

overall burden of persuasion;f emains with the plaintiff
employee.
we think that the Court of Appeals misunderstood
our prior rulings, ; 'nd imposed an inappropriate burden of
proof on the employer.

....

Accordingly, its judgment is

vacated, / and the case remanded for the application of the

I

correct legal standard.

Peter:

Were there any concurring opinions?
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No. 79-1764

Texas

De~t.

of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine

This case is here on certiorari to the Federal
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
It involves the proper evidentiary burden, born by
an employer, in a discrimination suit brought under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Court of Appeals held that when a discharged
employee proves a prima facie case of discrimination, the
employer then must prove - by a preponderence of the
evidence - that nondiscriminatory reasons existed.

The

Court further held that the employer also must prove that
the person retained in the position at issue was better
qualified than the rejected employee.
We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among
the circuits as to the appropriate burden of proof to rebut
a prima facie case of discrimination.
Our prior cases have held that the employer's
burden is to identify clearly - by evidence - a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision.
is merely a burden of going forward with evidence.

The

This

2.

overall burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff
employee.
We think that the Court of Appeals misunderstood
our prior rulings, and imposed an inappropriate burden of
proof on the employer.

Accordingly, its judgment is

vacated, and the case remanded for the application of the
correct legal standard.

Peter:

were there any concurring opinions?

l .

March 4, 1981

MEMORANDUM TO CONFERENCE

Cases held for No. 79-1764, Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine
No. 80-276, Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. vaughn
The issue in this case is whether CAB erred in
requiring an employer, in order to rebut a prima facie case
of discrimination, to prove by a preponderence of the
evidence that a legitimate reason for the rejection of the
plaintiff existed.
Petr, a black female, was disqualified from being
a sealtex operator at reap's plant. It is uncontested that
she established a prima facie case of discrimination. Petr's
supervisor testified that he disqualified petr because of
her low productivity and poor work. The DC held this
explanation insufficient to rebut the prima facie case
because reap had no objective standards by which to evaluate
productivity or quality of work.
CAO (Stephenson, Heaney: Gibson, dissented)
affirmed. Examining the relevent precedents the court stated
that the employer need only articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment action and need not
prove absence of discriminatory intent. The court stated:
"Therefore, while the burden of persuasion
for demonstrating discrimination remains with
the employee, the burden of producing
evidence of a legitimate reason lor the
employment practice shifts to the employer.
The employer bears the burden of proving ~
rrettnderence of the evidence that the
eg timate reason exists factually.•
(emphasis added).
In support of this principle, the court cited Turner v.
Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1977), the
case relied on by CAS In Burdine.

'\'

...

)/''

2.

Applying this standard to the employer's
explanation in this case, the court agreed with the DC that
the assertion that the employee had a poor performance
record was insufficient to rebut the prima facie case
because the employer lacked •objective production criteria.•
It concluded that the employer •failed to demonstrate the
legitimacy of its articulated reason by a preponderence.•
The CA's decision conflicts with Burdine. I will
vote to GVR.
No. 80-278, Munson v. Womack
The issue here is whether an employer's
explanation for a discharge is either legally unacceptable
or pretextual.
Petr, who is a state prosecutor, hired resp as an
investigator. Resp filed a Title VII suit against his former
employer, the county sheriff, alleging that the sheriff
fired resp because of race discrimination and that the
sheriff required black officers to abuse physically black
suspects. Petr immediately called resp into his office and
questioned him about the charges. Resp allegedly admitted
abusing black suspects. Petr investigated resp's charges,
found no corroboration, and fired resp.
Petr brought suit alleging that he had been fired
in retaliation for bringing a Title VII suit against the
sheriff. It is uncontested that he established a prima facie
case. Petr testified that resp was fired because of his
statement that he had abused black suspects. If the
statement was true, resp was unfit to be an investigator, if
the statement was false, resp was untruthful and unfit to be
an investigator. Petr denied having ever stated that he had
abused black suspects. The DC held that petr's explanation
had rebutted the prima facie case and that it had not been
shown to be pretextual.
CAB (Lay, Bright, McMillian) reversed. It held
that resp's explanation was legally insufficient to rebut
the prima facie case of retaliatory discharge, because, even
if resp had made the disputed statement, it had been
extracted during an improper examination about the substance
of resp's Title VII suit against the sheriff. The court
ruled that even if the explanation was legally acceptable,

•

3.

the DC's ruling that it was not pretextual was clearly
erroneous.
Burdine has little bearing on either ruling by the
CA. Whether the employer's explanation is legitimate and
non-discriminatory is a different question from whether he
has introduced enough evidence to articulate it. Also, the
question whether an explanation is pretextual involves a
later stage of the McDonnell Douglas test. Here, the CA
simply found that the employee had carried his burden of
showing that the explanantion was pretextual.
Aside from the Burdine issue, the case seems
sufficiently unusual and too factual to merit review. I will
vote to deny.

L.F.P., Jr.
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